Arms Control Wonk

The other day, I posted an entry at 38North outlining three scenarios for North Korea — that North Korea would eventually test a Musudan, that China has stayed Kim Jong Un’s hand for the moment and that North Korean politics have aligned against a test.

Two readers — Markus Schiller and Anon O’Moose — wrote in to observe that the piece would have been stronger had I considered a fourth scenario: what if the Musudan is not real at all?

I happent to think the Musudan is real for reasons I will explain, but I admit the piece would have been stronger had I considered the alternative possibility.  Consider this compensation for that oversight.

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In November 1996, I had the good fortune to attend an ISODARCO conference in Chengdu, with the added bonus of a side trip to visit China’s nuclear laboratory complex at Mianyang. Back then, ISODARCO – an enterprising Italian NGO founded in 1966 by Edoardo Amaldi and Carlo Schaerf — had somehow managed to corner the market on Track II conversations on strategic issues with Chinese counterparts. Not sure how the Italians managed to do this.

To my knowledge, the Mianyang visit was the first of its kind. Needless to say, foreign visitors were on a very short leash, but our entry was a significant gesture by our Chinese hosts, demonstrating serious intent to engage on strategic issues. These doors were soon closed as a result of the Cox Commission inquiry and report.

Jeffrey, our ACW information-gathering omnivore, somehow got ahold of my trip report and passed it along. My seventeen year-old assessment demonstrates, in dismaying detail, how ritualistic the anxieties over missile defenses have become. Countries of concern may have changed – back then, coercive PLA missile tests prompted debates over selling TMD to Taiwan — but not much else. Have a look:

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After escaping the clutches of a term paper draft, it returns!

Associated Press | Whoops.  Seems like the people in charge of the most powerful weapons known to man just weren’t up to the job, and needed a bit of extra training.  Not the first mistake of this manner.

Navy Live | Apparently, the Navy actually listens to talk about nuclear force cuts.  Hint: it doesn’t really like it.

Breaking Defense | The SM-3 Block IB missile seems to be working, following three successful tests since May of 2012.

Breaking Defense (again) | The X-47B performed a touch-and-go landing on the USS George H.W. Bush.  I wonder what’s next?

Foreign Policy | New START implementation is facing opposition, never mind the New START follow-on.  Yousaf Butt proposes a DIY solution. Is the President listening?

FAS Strategic Security Blog | Apparently, the Pentagon’s China Report omitted some key facts about strategic nuclear forces.

Bloomberg | Gary Milhollin sees Iran’s nuclear plans as a long-term, not a near-term, threat.

Nukes of Hazard | Senator Graham just can’t get enough MOX money, can he?  But he really promises it wasn’t pork or anything!

We hope you enjoyed this installment of FYRP.

I have a new column up at Foreign Policy (“Death Wears Bunny Slippers”) considering this recent story at the Air Force has suspended 17 ICBM launch officers are Minot Air Force Base and initiated proceedings against another.

The column is largely an act of media criticism.  After several Air Force mishaps relating to the handling of nuclear weapons systems came to light in 2007 and 2008, many of us began to argue that declining competence in the nuclear field was the inevitable result of the declining mission for nuclear-armed ICBMs and bombers.

What is interesting about the AP story about the disciplinary actions at Minot is that it represents an attempt to reframe that argument, blaming Global Zero and other arms control efforts for the loss of focus.  As I note in the piece, the timeline of mishaps and disarmament talk simply doesn’t support such an inference. The increase in disarmament talk is, like the increase in mishaps, the effect of the declining utility of these systems.

Having said that, I wanted to explore the relationship between readiness and reporting in a way that I couldn’t fit in the column.

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I have a column up at 38North discussing whether North Korea will test a Musudan anytime soon (“Pit or Get Off the Shot“) — with a bottle of the local plonk riding on the outcome with Joel Wit.

I touched briefly on the issue of politics inside North Korea, but wanted to have an extended discussion of the recent rumors of an assassination attempt against Kim Jong Un.

The reason for the rumors?  North Korean awarded one of Pyongyang’s traffic wardens — a woman named Ri Kyong Sim – the title of “DPRK hero” for “safeguarding the security of the headquarters of the revolution in an unexpected circumstance.”

What sort of unexpected circumstance you ask? Maybe an assassination attempt?

The reality seems to be a little disappointing.  New Focus International reported that Ri had extinguished a fire near a poster bearing the name of Kim Jong Un, a possibility also suggested by Andrei Lankov (subscription only).

Assassination is, of course, more interesting.  There is a reason that Frederick Forsyth had the Jackal try to kill DeGaulle, rather than merely defacing his portrait.

Still, the fire-near-a-poster story strikes me as plausible.  I thought maybe I might try to explain why.

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Aspiring wonks, here is your end-of-semester exam question: It’s not OK to use cluster munitions in metropolitan areas, but it is OK to use nuclear weapons against targets that fall within or close to them. Yes? No? Under some circumstances? Explain.

States that possess nuclear weapons are reluctant to argue whether and how their use applies to the laws of armed conflict. To do so would risk undermining deterrence by nullifying battlefield applications, except as a last resort and for responses in kind. Even here, I suppose legal scholars, like The Hague Court, would have more than a few words to say.

Cluster bombs are not supposed to be used in built-up areas because they can have indiscriminate and long-lasting effects. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are widely presumed to be targeted against command and control, war-supporting industry, and leadership targets in and around cities.

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Over at our Proliferation Prevention Program blog, you can see what my boss and I wrote regarding “The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation at the US-ROK May 2013 Presidential Summit.”

The first result of the decision to delay for most in my former line of work is likely to be relief.  But two years is not that far away.  And in terms of difficulty, may not be enough time to agree on a longer-term, 30- or 40-year agreement if the South keeps pushing on the enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) door.  Congress has a role, and while it may be an imperfect place, our Constitution and our laws give us no other for adjudication of such matters.

It’s incumbent on the Administration to submit proposed language allowing this “extension” to come into force, and on Congress to examine it.  At a minimum, the cognizant Committees ought to hold a hearing to establish clear legislative history, just in case we find that in 2015 we see another extension of this agreement being considered along side other, tough 123 agreements.

So far, only  Voice of America has covered this matter.  Note to Jack Spencer over at Heritage.org:  What exactly is “proliferation-resistant used-fuel-management technology”?  What makes it resist proliferation?  And if it’s so good, why don’t we let everyone use it?

One of our more engaged commentators sent along the following open letter to Representative Michael Turner (R-OH), commenting on some of the more interesting statements in his latest letter to the President Barack Obama.  He chose the nom de plume Anon O’Moose.

An Open Letter to Mr Turner, a Representative from Ohio

As an American taxpayer with engineering expertise in and historic experience with the topic of your letter to President Barack Obama on the 17^th of April; I would like to address certain issues of fact in that letter. Missile Defense development consumes significant national treasure and personnel effort so careful adherence to fact based discussion is important to the security of the nation.

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After a brief (SAT-induced) hiatus, it has returned!

Washington Examiner | Congressmen Doug Lamborn and Trent Franks give us their views on President Obama’s missile defense plans. Space-based interceptors are still needed, they say. How much that would cost?  And how practical that would be?

Lobe Log | Usha Sahay discusses the differences between Iran and North Korea.  With roads like these, how could anyone confuse the two?  More from Meir Javedanfar.

CS Monitor | Israel has ostensibly obvious motives for bombing Syria, but is it worth the risk?

FAS Strategic Security Blog | Russia’s SSBN fleet hasn’t been doing much. Come to think of it, the U.S.’s hasn’t been very active of late either.  The financial burdens of SSBN modernization are heavy both at home and abroad.  And while we’re reading the FAS blog, what are the Chinese doing with their ICBMs?

Department of Defense | The Pentagon’s eagerly awaited annual China military report has arrived, so now we know what the Chinese are doing with their ICBMs. Hey, now there’s a North Korea report along with it. There’s an Iran report, too, but you can’t read it.

Foreign Policy Association | Why is the NRA so interested in the ATT?  Scott Monje explains.

Aviation Week | The X-51A went really, really fast. Video.

The Diplomat | Despite being a phenomenal TV show, Battlestar Galactica cannot help us determine military policy.  Right?  Wrong, says James Holmes.

Japan Times | Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has lately been making some bold moves in cutting nuclear supply deals.  What is he heading towards?

We hope you enjoy this installment of FYRP.

Update | May 7. Here is the full text of the speech.

On April 24th, the Chairman of India’s National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, delivered an important address in New Delhi affirming the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent. Mr. Saran has over two decades of close engagement on strategic matters, including time spent as Foreign Secretary and Special Envoy dealing with the US-India civil-nuclear agreement. What he said, speaking in his personal capacity, bears close scrutiny.

The tone of these remarks is defensive at the outset, reflecting domestic criticisms of the pace of Indian strategic modernization programs. Mr. Saran also takes aim at US, Pakistani, and Chinese analysts who maintain that India sought the Bomb for reasons of status rather than national security. He seeks to set the record straight, making significant observations and recommendations in the process. Here are a few passages:

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