Interview with CTBTO’s Zerbo

Jeffrey Lewis 0:10

You're listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast. I'm Jeffrey Lewis. I'm the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the James Martin Center for Non-Deliberation Studies at the Monterey Institute. Aaron Stein is still on travel. He's somewhere between Istanbul and New York, but that's okay because with me is a special guest, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, the Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.

Welcome to Northern California. Thank you. So you were just up at Stanford for a meeting with Bill Perry, George Shultz, and that crowd, right? How'd that go?

Lassina Zerbo 0:39

I think it went well. I mean, as you know, it's always a special feeling to be between two secretaries of cabinet secretary, especially George Shultz, 94, still kicking. Is he really 94? 94 and still kicking. I mean, we spent the whole day together and then I didn't see him dozing.

Jeffrey 1:01

I can't even say that for myself. Oh, great. Well, just to start off, we have pretty educated listeners who are going to know what the CTBT is, but I still want to ask. And mostly it's for personal advice. When you're at a reception or in the United States, we'd say a cocktail party and someone asks you, what do you do?

How do you explain that? And how do you tell them what the CTBT is?

Lassina 1:24

I mean, when I'm asked what I do, of course, it's a difficult question because one thing I can say that we're making sure we're contributing to make the world safe and secure. By doing so, the CTBT is there to ban all nuclear techs. Explosion in all environments: underwater, underground, in the air. And this is our job, making sure that no nuclear test goes undetected. And as such, we contribute to the process of making sure that people not only develop nuclear tests, nuclear, nuclear weapon.

But also they're not in a position to improve for those who have it. And by then, our contribution comes to one, the important thing, and making sure that no one uses a nuclear weapon again.

Jeffrey 2:16

And you have an unusual background, right? Your predecessors at the CTBTO were diplomats, but you're technical. You have a PhD in geophysics, right? Yes, that's right. Yeah. And you spent the first part of your career in industry. Absolutely. Yeah, great. And I should also note that there are German speakers in your francophone. Indeed. So it's big changes at the CTBTO.

Yeah. Can you tell me a little bit about why you decided to go work for the CTBTO? And I guess in 2004, you ended up as the head of the International Data Center, right?

Lassina 2:46

Yes, that's right. Why I decided? Look, after spending 15 years in the industry, I wanted to change and then take up new challenges. And, you know, I happened to check accidentally at the time over Google and then to see what is on the market. And then I found this wonderful organization that was in need of geophysicists to lead the International Data Center.

And then here you go. I applied and then found myself successful. And then since 2004, I've been passionate about everything I'm doing in this organization.

Jeffrey 3:18

Well, I think it's going to be a real treat for our listeners because while we're all delighted that you're the head of the CTVTO, I think for a lot of our listeners, they're going to be as excited about your verification knowledge as anything else because it's a pretty wonky audience. I guess the place I'd start off with is you have a huge accomplishment on your resume, right?

China is now submitting its data to the CTVTO. And I mean, all I know is you visit in August and then by like January, the data is showing up. So how did you do that?

Lassina 3:47

I think it goes back to the excellent relationship that I had with all entities and constituencies in China since I joined the CTBT in 2004. At expert level, at political level, both the defense military and the foreign affairs. And then we've been working together and then building trust. And when you build trust, you put people in a situation where they find it easy to work with you.

They find it easy to compromise and then come to solution and then help you to move forward. I think visiting China was essential because I wanted to send a signal to the international community that China is today a major player economically. And then I wanted to see how we can get together to get them play the same role politically.

And the first step in... Their agreement to send data to the International Data Center in Vienna, one can say that a small step from a huge country is a big step for the international community.

Jeffrey 4:53

Yeah, absolutely. Well, I think a lot of us were just really surprised that you were able to get that. So the first technology I wanted to talk about is seismic monitoring. And I wondered, often I think those of us in the arms control community, the disarmament community, try to express how strong the CTBTOs, IMSs, and in particular the seismic portion of that is.

When someone asks you to talk about the capabilities of that system, what do you tell them?

Lassina 5:24

Starting with seismic, what I can say is that seismic monitoring, it's mainly, as you know, for natural activities like earthquake. But within that framework, we do record as well any type of explosion. I mean, our job at the CTBT is to make sure we screen out natural events from man-made events. So, explosion from earthquake. That's basically the seismic part of the job.

When this is done, I think we move to the next technologies. I mean, you can complement the seismic with infrasound, meaning... Any frequency, at the range of frequency we're working, that will help complement the detection of an event by seismicity. And then if the event was or had happened to be under the ocean, the hydroacoustic will play its role.

And then the radionuclide will come as a smoking gun.

Jeffrey 6:23

One of the questions I wanted to ask you is about monitoring thresholds, because sometimes I see various monitoring thresholds stated for the IMS, but almost always it's three stations and 90 percent. And I wonder what you think about that, because to me, it seems that while I understand the international community would like a 90 percent chance of detecting an event.

You know, if I'm a bad actor who's thinking about cheating on the treaty, you know, a 10% chance of getting away with it's not very good, but neither is a 20%. So I wonder if you have any thoughts about how effective you think the IMS would be in deterring any clandestine nuclear testing.

Lassina 7:07

Look, first of all, I mean, you said it right. We talk about a 90% chance of detecting a Nevada. That's pretty high. It's high still at a time where today we only 90% completed. And even when we were 70% completed in the detection of the first DPRK, Democratic Republic of Korea event, Were able to detect signals and events that were pretty low compared to the threshold that was anticipated in negotiation of the treaty by the technical experts that lay out the international monitoring system.

So today, although not 100% completed, our performance is far below. When I say below, I mean the detection threshold is below what was anticipated for 100% international monitoring system. So we're pretty good right now.

Jeffrey 8:03

Yeah, I wanted to ask about that because we're getting really close to the point where the system's completed. So when it's completed, is it complete or do we imagine a series of continuing improvements just as technology gets better? What's the future for the IMS after completion of the station list?

Lassina 8:21

I mean, in science, nothing can be said completed because you have to follow evolution, you have to follow progress, you have to follow the state of the art in technology. And this is what we're doing. The processing method, the sensitivity of new way of building monitoring station, especially seismic station, you know, how we deal with the signal to noise ratio.

Those are a set of improvements that will evolve eventually. And then make this international monitoring system probably finer than what has been ever anticipated in the beginning. And then we're hopeful that now that we're involved in the science and technology conferences to allow people to help us think out of the box, that by exchanging with scientists of the world, we'll be able to help progress the technology.

Jeffrey 9:09

So, one of the things I wanted to ask before we move on from the question of seismic monitoring is, the last time I was at the CTBTO, and it's a great place to visit. Everybody should do it. I got to see the International Data Center and the model radionuclide station on top of the building. One thing I noticed is there were a lot of disaster relief posters there.

And so there seems to be an interest in secondary use, although the IMS is intended to watch for explosions. Ground motion is ground motion. And so I wondered if you could talk about using the IMS system in disaster relief and some of the other secondary uses.

Lassina 9:45

This is what we call the civil and scientific application of the technology that we use for nuclear test monitoring. So those are the spin-offs of all the technology we have. But to capture and then give you a better illustration, let me take the Fukushima Daiichi event in East Japan. During this disastrous event, our seismic technology, together with the hydroacoustic, were able to detect and then screen out the tsunami and the earthquake.

So the earthquake and the generating tsunami. Wow, you can see them both. Yeah, we can see them both. But what I'm saying, you are first an earthquake, and the earthquake does, the consequence of the earthquake was a tsunami, depending on where it is, which geological structure, its attacks, and then so forth. So both technologies were able to give us better indication about the earthquake and the tsunami.

Then comes the inflation technology. That gave us an idea of how the nuclear power plant exploded. Which is interesting for us to know scientifically. And then in a unique fashion, our international global system, the radionuclide system that we have, the monitoring station, we're able to follow the dispersion of isotope, radioisotope around the globe. This is unique because we have a global system.

So this is how the four technology were tested during one event, a disastrous event in East Japan. So we're able to provide data both for tsunami warning, but also for environmental issue, should a radio isotope have an impact on health. And that's why we're able to share data with the Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the World Health Organization.

Jeffrey 11:43

Great. And did you when you were when you were thinking about using the IMS in this way, did you find that the international environment was pretty receptive or did you find that there was any kind of pushback among member states? Because, I mean, on the one hand, this is this wonderful thing you're doing and everybody should be for it.

But, you know, sometimes people are not always so reasonable.

Lassina 12:04

I'll go back to what I said in the beginning, that things are evolving and we have to adapt ourselves, including diplomats, to the reality of the world today. The CTBT and its international monitoring system have a mandate, which is nuclear test monitoring. But can we ignore the spin-off of the technology that we're using if it's to save humanity, if it's to help the cause of the international community?

This is our job, because let's face it, nuclear test monitoring is not the priority of the 183 countries. The first priority, I would say, but it is a good priority because we're contributing to safety and security of the world. But I mean, when people see, especially in the developing world, that some of the spin-off of the technology help deal with issues of catastrophes and so forth, I think it can only be a plus for this organization.

Jeffrey 12:54

Well, I really wanted to ask you about that because I think that's an incredibly important point. And I think one of the challenges that we see in the nonproliferation regime is that Particularly because organizations are usually, as I said, your two predecessors were German speakers. You're a French speaker. You're from Burkina Faso. So you have, I think, a slightly better sense of the developing world than somebody, for example, like me would.

And so I wanted to ask you about the task of taking nonproliferation and taking something like the CTBTO and making the case globally that it's in everybody's interest and it's not just something that a couple of rich countries want.

Lassina 13:35

First of all, the reason why I'm here myself. It means that there's been an evolution towards building capacity and then having somebody from the developing world heading an organization that deals with something that is not the first priority in that part of the world. Is unique, but I think it gives hopes. It gives hopes, and then it's probably, and this is what I would like to see in me heading this organization, be a source of inspiration for the developing world to be part of this agenda.

Nuclear security, nuclear safety, the safety and security of the world, and then to make sure we live in a world that is just a world of peace and security, not only for ourselves, but for our children and our grandchildren.

Jeffrey 14:19

Well, so I must have asked you that question too early because you don't know this, but my co-host Aaron Stein and I are always struggling to end our podcasts on a positive note. And that would have been a great one to end on, but we've got a lot of other things to discuss. You mentioned radionuclide detection. And one of the questions I wanted to ask is a kind of evolution in the way people are talking about that.

The way I learned it If you have a seismic event, you can use radionuclides to tell you if it has a nuclear character. But increasingly, there is this kind of argument that the radionuclide analysis is so good that you can use it to detect events, even if there was no seismic data. And there's a big controversy that stems from a paper a guy named Lars de Geer wrote, arguing that there may have been these undetected North Korean nuclear tests in 2010.

I've been a little critical of that paper, although I have a lot of respect for Daguerre himself. I wonder if you could say something about how you think about the role of radionuclide detection in the context of using all of the aspects of the international monitoring system that you have.

Lassina 15:29

Let me say first that all technologies as set forth by the experts when the treaty was negotiated complement each other. It would be adventurous of me to say that one can do the job without the others, because they complement each other, as I said right from the beginning. Radionuclide indeed is key in giving the nuclear nature of an event.

But as you know, the CTBT International Monitoring System and the organization itself, our job is to give the technical specification for member states to make up their mind. As I often say in a pretty easy way, I say, we say one plus one, and it's up to you to say equal two, or if you decide equal three, I mean, that's your call.

But we're making sure that the one and one are done in the way that we give you the clarity technically for you to make up your own mind. That's the first point. So now coming to how radionuclide plays, indeed, it's what we call the smoking gun. You may have a smoking gun. It's true. Maybe you can be in a situation where it was so small in terms of the events that the detection hasn't been that high.

You refer to last year's paper. I will not go into scientific polemic on this issue, but what I can say is that the fact that those technologies were put together to complement each other is a plus. But not only the technology that we have, Within the international monitoring system. One needs to take into account the national technical means of the state signatories.

And it's both the national technical means together with the international monitoring system and the verification regime that we're building that we can be sure that no nuclear test explosion goes undetected.

Jeffrey 17:18

Well, you mentioned one plus one and letting the state's parties draw the conclusion of what that equals. I had a question about how you communicate uncertainty. So in statistics, if we're thinking about the kinds of errors, I think in the arms control community, we're quite worried with catching cheaters and we're worried about the cheaters we might miss, which is a type one error.

But I would imagine as the international monitoring system gets incredibly refined, we start running the risk of type two errors. We find things that may look like a test, but that's just because the system is so sensitive. It detects incredibly small conventional explosions. I think there was a military decontamination exercise that set off radionuclide detectors a few years ago.

So when you are talking to states' parties about one plus one, how do you convey to them the inherent uncertainty associated with the different technologies?

Lassina 18:15

Look, we have what we call, you know, one has to take that all our stations are certified. When you say certified, it means the station meets a technical specification under the framework of the treaty and the international monitoring system. There's a reason for that. The reason indeed includes how detection is made, what is the threshold of error, how is the strength of the detection capability, and so forth.

So when we detect an event, when we do our part of our screening, natural event from explosion, Within explosion as well, we have to screen a chemical explosion and an explosion that have nuclear nature. And how we can correlate what is done is that to bring one plus one. I'll give an example on the 2013 event in the Korean Peninsula. We had an event for weeks, no one, including this country, were able to find a sniff of radio nuclear that could have been correlated to this event.

But 55 days later, one of our stations in Takasaki in Japan detected a sniff of radionuclide with the two major isotopes that could help us anticipate the fission, the time of the fission. That was the Xenon-133 and the Xenon-131. The reaction of those two can give you an indication of The timing of the fission. And when we do that timing, we realize that it could have been plus or minus three days linked to the event that was announced by the DPRK at the time.

And those are the information that we give as one plus one.

Jeffrey 19:54

Well, that's a fantastic answer. I should say, I mean, I think one of the interesting things about this conversation is we're doing this in a situation where the treaty hasn't entered into force. And so in a real event where there was a nuclear test and the state denied it, DPRK, of course, didn't bother denying it, we would have the ability to do an on-site inspection.

Absolutely. And one of the things that the CTBTO has done lately that I think is really impressive is there have been a series of these field exercises involving on-site inspections. And I wondered if you could just talk a little bit about the nature of those exercises and what you think you've learned and whether the experiences of those exercises have resulted in new requirements or changes to how you would imagine doing business.

Lassina 20:37

To illustrate the importance of on-site inspection, I'll go back to 2009. 2009, the DPRK-ANOS test at the time didn't have a sniff of radionuclide isotope. In that sense, we stayed weeks, months, and then no one could give any sniff of radioisotope that could have been correlated to the event. So what needs to be done to verify that it was indeed a nuclear test explosion?

The only thing is on-site inspection, which kicks in only if the treaty enters into force. And this is why we have to make sure this capability is mastered in a way where we contribute to building trust for the international community and the state signatories, for them to know that even if the remote monitoring didn't get some of the detection, when the treaty enters into force, we have the possibility to conduct an on-site inspection.

Because you might not see something remotely, but when you're close to the site where we give an area where we know with confidence, 90% and over 90% confident that this is where the test happened or the event happened, with an on-site inspection, we're able to give some indication that could not be found remotely. And this is the importance of on-site inspection.

Jeffrey 21:56

Well, I think that's a really nice point to transition to the bigger issue, which is how do we get this treaty into force? And so I wanted to ask you a question about the future of the CTBT. You know, as I'm sure you know better than anybody, the CTBTO is technically a preparatory commission. And the international community at this point gets the Benefits of the international monitoring system and the norm against testing seems reasonably strong, but it can't enter into force until a list of states sign and ratify the treaty.

And I will spare you having to name and shame them, but I will do it for you. I will start with my own country, the United States, followed quickly by China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, and North Korea. So what do we have to do to get the treaty into force?

Lassina 22:43

You forgot one, Israel.

Jeffrey 22:45

Israel. Oh, gosh. Yeah.

Lassina 22:47

Okay, look, what do we do to get this treaty into force? The first one would be building confidence in the verifiability of the treaty by the verification system Where the international community has been investing. The international community has invested a billion dollars today. I'm coming from the industry. When you invest a billion dollars, you need a return in investment.

Is this organization, this technology that we're putting together, worth the money that we've put in? Are we able to make sure that complementing the national technical means, we are? Nearly 100% sure that no nuclear test explosion goes undetected. And this is what we strive to do at the CTBT with the International Monitoring System and the Preparatory Commission.

You mentioned Preparatory Commission. The word preparatory is a word that I stopped to like. I stopped to like because after more than 15 years, we nothing changed. Close to preparatory. You're prepared. We're prepared. Now we're commissioning. Let me put it this way. We've done the preparatory work. We're ready. We've proven that we have a trustworthy system that can detect, that can make sure, that serve as a deterrent for the international community.

And we've passed the preparatory phase. We're commissioning the verification regime. And then we're waiting for the entry into force. And we're working towards building trust and confidence Within the eight remaining countries for them to deal with the domestic issue in their process to ratify this treaty and get it close to its entry into force.

Jeffrey 24:26

So how long do you think the CTBT can survive without action from those eight states? And I would put the United States probably at the top of my list.

Lassina 24:39

It's difficult to give an idea of how long it can survive, but our role is to make sure it survives because what is the ultimate goal? The contribution we bring to international peace and security. There's no way and no room to go back. We've built a system. We're moving. We have 183 countries that have signed the treaty, 163 that have ratified.

The treaty is nearly universal. We have to make sure we get to the entry into force. And we're working towards that. We're building trust. We're working towards building confidence. And then we think we're getting there. But you're right. Treaty fatigue. We have to make sure that those who have signed and ratified this treaty for the past 17, nearly 17 years, don't say to themselves, what's happening?

Why should we let ourselves held hostage by a hate country where we have 183 countries that have signed and 163 that have said never to nuclear testing? And this is one of the biggest challenges. At the same time, maintaining, operating and sustaining the infrastructure that we've built so far.

Jeffrey 25:45

And I should, at this point, I think, give a lot of credit to Indonesia, because that list used to be nine states. And I think a lot of us used to complain, why is Indonesia refusing to sign the treaty? And the Indonesians would quite reasonably point out that there were other states that were of greater concern that should probably move first.

But to their great credit, I think the Indonesians did the right thing. And in 2002, they ratified the treaty. Yeah. But let's let's talk about the United States a little bit, because obviously, as an American, one of the questions that I have is how I can get my own country to ratify ratify the treaty. But before we do that, I wanted to ask you about the differences that you experience when you come to the United States and talk about the treaty versus when you're in other countries.

Because I think one of the great things that my boss, Bill Potter, does is he's built a think tank that isn't really dominated by the debate in D.C. We do have a D.C. office, but most of our staff are here in Northern California and we have a Vienna Center on disarmament and nonproliferation. So as we try to take a more international perspective, do you see differences in the debate in the United States versus when you're in other capitals?

Lassina 26:49

Differences, not that much. I think a ratification process takes every state to go through its Congress, its Senate. And it's a difficult process sometimes because this involves political issues which we shouldn't get involved. What we have to do is to give all the elements, the background information that is needed to build confidence in a country with its constituency, be it the Senate or the Congress, to proceed towards ratification.

What we do, the United States is well involved in the work of the CTBT. They're contributing to over 20% of our budget. We're working fine with the expert. We're doing improvement together. We're building stations. Apart from two, the United States has built all its 37 stations on its territory for the international monitoring system. There's a lot of investment that is done, and the United States should capitalize on this.

They should see the return investment, the plus they're getting from this organization and the investment they've made. And you... Wherever you are, you should help that process going forward by talking to your constituency and helping Under-Secretary Rose Goldmuller in the leadership that she's taking in education and information about the need and the benefit of the ratification of this treaty by using other factors like some of the consequences of nuclear weapon testing.

Jeffrey 28:17

And so what's next for the CTBT? As we talk about trying to build confidence, the IMS is nearing completion. There are a series of field exercises. As you know, you're not really preparatory anymore. You are prepared. So what do you see as the big challenges that the CTBTO has to address in the future that will sustain interest and support for the organization while we wait for various constituencies to see the light on banning nuclear testing?

Lassina 28:46

The challenge is, you use the word sustain. It's sustained maintenance and operating the infrastructure that is there for the verification regime. Our stations are aging, technology advancing, the budget is still the same. We have to make sure our state signatory trusts the work that is done and the investment they've put in to keep us maintaining This infrastructure is unique because this is one of the few environments where technology drives policy.

We want to keep on driving policy to build the trust and confidence for people to keep believing in this verification regime and in creating those conditions for the entry into force. And therefore, keep our world safe and secure.

Jeffrey 29:36

Well, that is not only a positive note, but I think that's a great illustration of why I can't think of anybody better to be running the CTBTO at this moment. Dr. Lassina Zerbo, thank you very much for joining us. Thank you, Jeffrey. Thank you. And as always, thank you for listening. Remember, if you like the podcast, you can always leave a review on iTunes.

Have a good day.

Lassina 29:52

Thanks. Thank you.