NPT Review Conference Follies I

Jeffrey Lewis 0:02

Aaron, I hear you sighing. You're killing me. OK, let's try that again. You are listening to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the leading podcast on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. I'm Jeffrey Lewis, the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog and a scholar at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

Aaron Stein 0:29

And I'm Aaron Stein. I'm an associate fellow with the Royal United Services Institute in London, a doctoral fellow at the Geneva Center for Security Policy, and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council's Rafiq Hariri Center.

Jeffrey 0:41

The 2015 review conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, known among wonks as the REVCON, collapsed in acrimony. After weeks of debate over disarmament between the nuclear haves and have-nots, the parties failed to agree on a consensus statement after Egypt and the United States deadlocked over the details of a long-planned conference on a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East.

Joining us to talk about the REVCON is Andrea Berger, the Deputy Director of the Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Program at the Royal United Services Institute. She went to New York, but all she got was a lousy, well, hey, Andrea, did you even get a t-shirt?

Andrea Berger 1:18

No t-shirt, Jeff. Just a drink with you one evening.

Jeffrey 1:21

Yeah, that was fun. Although even by that point, it was kind of clear it was going to be a bummer, right?

Andrea 1:27

It was pretty gloomy by that stage. Yeah, definitely.

Jeffrey 1:30

So I guess the big question is, it seems like there were these two problems. One was there was a really acrimonious discussion about disarmament. Which I guess didn't really make it into the press, and it either got resolved or just pushed aside, and then things collapsed over the conference on weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East.

So I guess we'll talk about them one and then the other. But I guess my big question to you, since you spent more time there than I did, was it really about the weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, or did the disarmament debate— Did that factor into the collapse of the RevCon?

Andrea 2:16

So... My understanding of it is, and this is from the portion of the review conference that I saw, is that the disarmament debate is really what made everyone very aggravated all the way through. But the WMD free zone in the least issue was sort of the death blow, if you will. And the disarmament debate had looked pretty bad for the first few weeks.

We've had the humanitarian initiative and the Huge number of states that are supporting that initiative basically insist on a few things. They wanted recognition that the humanitarian conferences that they've been running in the past few years have been welcome additions to the NPT context, that they've brought new information to light, that that new information suggests that there's an increased risk of nuclear weapons use, and that that has policy implications.

And that set of demands is something that nuclear weapon states pushed back on pretty firmly, and the French especially. The French were probably the most vocal of the bunch on this set of issues. So it was clear from the outset that those positions might be irreconcilable, and even the most clever language would still not bring them together.

Aaron 3:40

Yeah, I mean – I'm wondering if you could actually just expand upon that a little bit. I mean that seemed to just be the dividing point that was moving forward in that the people pushing for the humanitarian initiative wanted more strident language and the P5 and in particular the French even wanted humanitarian to sort of strip out of it altogether and focus on different issues.

I mean is that correct? Yeah.

Andrea 4:04

Yeah, they would have loved that. I think they probably realized, and the French probably realized at one stage, that they definitely weren't going to get that. Their position was... One and they were facing 150 plus others in this room who all wanted a recognition of the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. So clearly they knew they were fighting an uphill battle here, but they certainly would have preferred if it had not been mentioned.

And actually the final draft document that was not passed Was pretty bland. The conference noted a whole bunch of things, but not many aspects of the humanitarian initiative were welcomed. There was certainly no acknowledgement of the need for something to fill a so-called legal gap. So many non-nuclear weapon states Were quite dissatisfied once the draft tax started getting watered down in weeks three and certainly by week four.

Jeffrey 5:10

Hey, I wanted to ask about, well, I want to ask about the various proposals for legal instruments. But before we do that, one of the talking points that struck me as curious that I wanted to ask you about was this idea that new information has come to light. I sound like the big Lebowski. Or I guess the dude.

The dude. Yeah, not the big Lebowski. So it struck me as a curious talking point. I mean, I'm very sympathetic to the humanitarian initiative and the focus on those consequences. And we can talk about why I think that's so important. But Is it really true that new things have come to light? I mean I feel like we have always known that a nuclear war would be a horrific event from a humanitarian perspective.

And so while I welcome the attention for it, I guess I was struck at the curiousness of the talking point that we sort of know something about the horribleness of nuclear weapons that maybe we didn't know 20 years ago.

Andrea 6:12

And a lot of the nuclear weapon states made that argument. So there was a debate at one point in week three over new information from whose perspective. So the text actually got amended to say that the risk or consequences of nuclear use was higher than some states previously understood. And the case made, especially by the Austrians over what that new information includes, was that there's been research done by the Humanitarian Consequences Initiative that adds more detail to the discussion on environmental impacts and especially on food and water security.

And that there's been some additional research from archives on the consequences or I should say actually the risk of nuclear use. And that I think he's probably referring to a report that Chatham House did drawing upon some archival material. Now, nuclear weapon states argue that they've known that stuff all along and that. The risks that might be made apparent by archival material is not in any way reflective of a contemporary situation and therefore is not relevant.

So there was a debate over those very points about the significance of the information as well.

Jeffrey 7:30

Wait, before Aaron jumps in, I've got to ask a question about that. They didn't really suggest that maybe they could have just a little nuclear war, did they? That's what that sounds like.

Andrea 7:45

No, I don't think they did. So I think probably the most controversial statement that got made was by the French representative at some stage in week three, when he suggested that there was no risk whatsoever of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use. And I think that rubbed a lot of non-nuclear weapon states the wrong way.

Aaron 8:11

I'm just sort of curious to expand that a little bit. I mean there's an argument made that the humanitarian initiative is like almost skipping a step in that nuclear weapons reductions have to be step by step, i.e. In bilateral and eventually multilateral mechanisms that seize the eventual reduction of nuclear weapons. I mean do you think there's any credence to that argument?

And certainly I know that that came up a lot as sort of a counter to sort of the humanitarian initiative gaining such traction this year.

Andrea 8:40

Yeah, and so we're now discussing whether or not the step-by-step process is the way to go. And one of the difficulties here is that there's really not much meat on the bones in terms of what a step-by-step process includes. And some non-nuclear weapon states have requested that one of the things the nuclear weapon states go away and do in the coming review cycle is actually articulate what a step-by-step process means.

What nuclear holders accuse the humanitarian supporters of is circumventing the step-by-step approach that we haven't detailed by pushing for a legal instrument to fill a so-called gap. So it's really a difficult sort of question because... You've got two very different approaches to the near and medium term on disarmament.

Jeffrey 9:36

Well, that's interesting because I also think we're skipping a step, although I'm not sure I think that in a way that would make the nuclear weapon states happy. One of the questions I have, and I'd be interested to see what you think about it, is I am really – I have – well, I've always been concerned that when we – Put legal instruments involving the prohibition of nuclear weapons first, were doing so having not established a prohibition on their use.

And it seems to me that in the case of chemical weapons, You know, we banned their use in, what, 1925, and it took us until the 1990s to get a convention prohibiting their possession. And so it's always seemed to me that we are skipping a step, but that's exactly why I think the humanitarian initiative is such a great thing because it puts the emphasis on how horrible use would be.

And then, you know, I think that's eventually – The route to disarmament. So I'm not going to ask you, don't you agree? But I mean how does – if you have that weird view like I do, should I be more upset at the nuclear weapon states for dragging their heels or should I be more upset at the non-nuclear weapon states for pushing too fast for a prohibition on possession?

Aaron 11:02

Can I just jump in here with one more observation? I mean is it almost like just like – Is it almost a bad tactic? I mean that ultimately we want to get to the point of disarmament. But does this create like an avenue, particularly with the emphasis that there's been new information that's coming to light? It sort of diverts the debate and sort of allows the nuclear weapons state to war against this obviously.

To almost argue points that I guess distract from the overarching emphasis on reductions of nuclear weapons with the goal of their eventual elimination.

Andrea 11:40

So on Jeff's question, Jeff, I actually wonder if the non-aligned movement is sponsoring this podcast because they love your proposal for an instrument that would specify, basically that would ban the use or threat of using it. They've been arguing for that for a long time, even before the 2005 review conference. And they pushed for that again this year.

Jeffrey 12:07

By the way, this doesn't make me happy.

Aaron 12:10

I don't think of Jeffrey ever in the non-aligned movement.

Andrea 12:14

It's one of their big proposals, actually. And they put it forth again this year. There were provisions in the initial drafts that asked for the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiating such a treaty. Now, that request came in alongside... Whole bunch of other provisions that had legal language in it, so the debate at RevCon was actually, I thought, really fractured. And to put it this way, you had this consistent discussion over a legal gap. So you had some states arguing that a legal gap really exists because nuclear weapons are not banned in the same way that chemical or biological weapons are.

You had some countries arguing that a legal gap exists because Article 6 says that nuclear weapon states need to pursue effective measures, but we don't actually say what effective measures are. You had some states who said there's a legal gap because there's no treaty against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. And then you had some who said there's a legal gap because all we've been doing to date is pursuing bilateral or unilateral disarmament measures.

And those don't really count in Article 6 because Article 6 specifies multilateral negotiations. So there's... A complete array of viewpoints on what this legal gap is. And then you, of course, get the nuclear weapon states who say there's no legal gap at all because Article 6 is intentionally leaving open the prospect of continued nuclear weapons possession and even potentially the threat of their use.

So there's a real divide there. And then you get the divides over how to rectify the legal gaps. And here's where one of the significant aspects of this review conference might come in, because you've got now over 100 states that say we need to start Negotiating a legal instrument to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. So not pursuing the non-aligned movement proposal to focus on use of threat abuse, but instead to go straight for the whole hog and either outline steps to disarmament and make them legally binding or to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves or both.

So we're at a really interesting junction where you could see potentially a As a result of the frustration at this review conference, but also the momentum that the humanitarian initiative has created, this push to negotiate that sort of legal instrument.

Jeffrey 14:49

So it sounds like Alexander Kement, the very fine diplomat from Austria, who certainly all of us here at CNS adore, sounds like he didn't have a very easy time managing his caucus, as it were. Is this a good idea?

Andrea 15:05

No. It's a big idea, to be fair. Okay.

Jeffrey 15:07

Yeah, no, I don't – I wouldn't say – I'm actually trying to be very nice because I actually have a lot of respect for him. And so what I was struck by is – well, I guess one of the pushbacks I'm hearing from the administration is that while there were places that they weren't willing to go in terms of legal instruments, that they, I think, felt like when they tried to say like, well, what else would you want?

That they – and maybe this is – they only say this because the conference has collapsed and everybody is pointing fingers. But the argument, which I'd love to hear if you think is a real one or just spin, the argument is once we got past the kind of ICANN stuff, the Convention Against Nuclear Weapons, then there wasn't a set of proposals after that.

Do you think that's fair or is that unfair?

Andrea 16:05

I don't think there were many – Feasible short-term proposals from non-nuclear weapon states, aside from a reporting form. And that's really the only one where I think there was broader agreement between non-nuclear weapon states about what their nuclear counterparts should be doing next. Apologies, too many nuclears and non-nuclears. There had been a group in the last review cycle that had asked non-nuclear weapon states to help them flesh out a reporting form, so basically what they expected nuclear-armed states to report on in 2014, but now for the next review cycle as well.

Things like stockpile numbers, numbers of deployed and non-deployed weapons, amounts of fissile material, etc. And those sorts of proposals were put into the initial drafts of the final document at this review conference and were insisted upon pretty strongly until they got firm pushback from nuclear weapon states. So that's one of the things that was, you could argue, more feasible than a full-fledged legal instrument prohibiting Nuclear weapons, but still in terms of what might be a starter for the P5 wasn't there.

So there could have been other smaller things that if non-nuclear weapon states had corralled around might have realistically gained momentum and caused the P5 to cave on a few points. So if they had asked that in the P5 process in the next review cycle they do certain things, Work on a glossary that includes these terms. We want to see fissile material defined.

We want to see X defined. Those sorts of proposals might have gotten traction, but they didn't narrow their sights quite as much as some might have thought they should.

Jeffrey 18:15

Since we're beating up on the have-nots, I want to ask about... Bad behavior on the part of haves, because the pushback I hear when I talk to the other side of the argument is that the nuclear weapon states did all kinds of, you know, incredibly frustrating things. I think you already mentioned the French saying that there was sort of, you know, no risk of an accidental war at all.

And the other one that stuck out to me was the When the Japanese pushed to call on world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki for the 70th anniversary of the bombing, which I think is a great idea, the Chinese sort of inexplicably said, yeah, well, there was a reason you got bombed.

Aaron 18:58

Was that the lowest point of the conference?

Jeffrey 19:00

Right. Yeah. Nuclear weapon states. What's up with the attitude? Yeah.

Andrea 19:09

They certainly weren't perfect at the review conference either. And that's a perfect example. There were others as well. I mean, the US and UK at one stage were so unhappy with the draft coming out of the subsidiary body working on disarmament that they essentially insisted that the subsidiary body be ditched. They just didn't want to deal with it.

And especially the Swiss chairperson of that subsidiary body was not very pleased with that proposal, nor were many non-nuclear weapon states who saw the behavior as obstructive. So the P5 aren't angels. We've had a really tough month.

Jeffrey 19:52

Now, this is a really interesting question for you because you are sort of Austrian, sort of Canadian, and now because you live in London, sort of from a nuclear weapons state. So which of the various aspects of your identity did you find were invoked most frequently while you were there?

Andrea 20:14

I try to put myself in all shoes there, but I basically have an identity crisis between the different – Constituencies on the humanitarian issue of you know having nationality of a humanitarian impact driver country really Austria of a uncomfortable NATO middle state in Canada and the perspective of I would argue, one of the more moderate nuclear weapons states.

So, yeah, it is a tough one to try to come to grips with.

Jeffrey 20:49

Okay, so disarmament was not why the conference collapsed, and I know Aaron wants to talk about why it did.

Aaron 20:55

Yeah, I mean, it's the Middle East WMD free zone and all that fun stuff that goes on with stuff relating back to 2010 and the lack of progress, let's say, on the holding of a major conference towards the establishment of the zone. Right.

Andrea 21:10

Indeed. So that was the death blow was on the WMD free zone in the Middle East. And it was the US, UK and Canada that made the final call to say no. And they pointed the finger essentially at Egypt and said, you've been entirely unreasonable. One Western diplomat went on record saying that Egypt has overshot the runway.

Jeffrey 21:34

Was that that was the US statement, right?

Andrea 21:36

The US pretty firmly said, Said that they had been unreasonable. I don't think they specified...

Jeffrey 21:43

I actually can't remember if they specified... Yeah, because I had a... It was pointed to me that someone said to me... I'm trying to be careful. Someone who was not a reporter, but was a... I don't know what to say. I thought we named names. Yeah, Egypt, right? Yeah.

Andrea 22:07

It was fairly clear. I mean, the discussion in the last hour of the review conference was really dominated by the US, Canada, UK and Egypt. Well, let me ask because I...

Jeffrey 22:26

One of the big mechanical questions that I have, and I guess this helps explaining what happened, is the US, UK, and Canada had real problems with, as I understand it, the fact that the organization of the conference and the agenda would not be done by consensus. Right. And the Egyptians didn't want to give on that point. Is that a fair summary of what the nature of the dispute was?

I mean, it wasn't about whether or not to have a conference, right? It was about whether the Israelis had to join a consensus for its agenda and so forth.

Andrea 23:02

That's right. They definitely still wanted a conference to take place. I think there was agreement on that basic point. But then all of the details of that were quite controversial. So the Egyptians and other Arab League countries, Wanted basically to abandon the Finnish coordinator. They said his mandate had elapsed and instead put more responsibility in the UN Secretary General and a special representative that he nominated.

And for the Egyptians, wanted the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, the UK, US and Russia, to take on more responsibility if a conference gets postponed again. But the thing was, at the same time, they seem to imply that they didn't necessarily want those co-sponsors to have the ability to what they might call meddle in the facilitation process and be part of the agenda discussion, especially.

Furthermore, they changed the language so that rather than like in 2010 when it said that all states in the Middle East had to take part in the conference, this time it only said that they had to be invited. So it completely left the door open to holding a conference without Israel, in other words. So the situation, if I were Washington, I would have been sitting there looking at that draft and thinking, I'm being asked here to take responsibility for this conference being postponed, and especially if not all parties come to the table.

But... I'm not being allowed to have an active role in the discussion over the agenda, which might allow me to create an agenda that gets everyone to the table. So it seems like a bit of an unfair proposition, made even more unfair by the fact that the deadline slapped on in, I think, a rather arbitrary fashion was the 1st of March 2016.

So we had to accomplish all this by the next nine months.

Aaron 25:08

What do you think the motivations were on the Egyptian side there? I mean besides sort of the historical things tied to the zone with Cairo, that had to be sort of what we would call a poison pill. I mean don't you think? I mean going in and that there was going to be disagreement. Was there a fallback position that just collapsed because there was nothing else to go to?

Andrea 25:27

Good question. I'm still not sure what they were playing at, whether they maybe came out with a strong hand. And were initially prepared to soften, but then actually didn't. I'm not sure. It was a pretty tough stance to suggest ditching the finish coordinator, but then have such a short timeline as well. And to frame the... Involvement of the co-sponsors in the way that they did, and to be honest, I'm really not sure where that was coming from. Certainly wanting to demonstrate deep dissatisfaction at the fact that a conference hadn't happened by 2012 or in the last review cycle, but beyond that, I don't know. And did you sense like, sort of like any like, you, you?

Aaron 26:11

Egypt sort of always leads the charge and you always hear that they're sort of chafing underneath them, that some of the other Arab states are more amenable to a different sort of language being used, any sort of resolution. I mean did you get any sense that that was going on this time around or was it basically everybody else was lining up behind Egypt and Egypt was speaking for the group?

Andrea 26:31

It's difficult for me to say because I wasn't there for as much of that discussion as I would have liked to have been. But going on the initial draft from the Arab League, they did support some of the points that Egypt insisted on. They had some different dates. For example, the Arab League initially said that a conference had to be convened, I believe it was in 180 days from the date a review conference final document was passed.

So... You know, similarly short timelines. They actually, if I remember correctly, didn't even have as much involvement from the co-sponsors in their initial proposal as ended up in the final draft. So I'm not sure, but it looks like they supported Egypt on at least some of the points that Cairo was trying to drive home.

Jeffrey 27:20

So... I had a second question about mechanics. So if I understand what you're saying correctly, and it's sort of the way I heard it, It doesn't necessarily mean it's right. Maybe we talk to the same people. But, I mean, it sounds like the U.S. and others were willing to move off the Finnish coordinator and put the responsibility – have the secretary general issue the invitations.

And it even sounds like some of the date issues were sort of – I don't know what you would say – Were workable. But at the end, it really came down to whether they would just go ahead and have the conference without Israeli participation. And then so it'd be just a chance to beat up on Israel. One of the things I'm struck by mechanically is why did the chair... Well, I mean, I guess maybe I suspect I know the answer, but I'm surprised that the chair...

Put the language in so that it was the US, UK, and Canada who were blowing up the agreement rather than, say, Egypt. So do you have a sense of the politics of that?

Andrea 28:35

Again, hard to say because, to be honest, I wasn't there for that. But judging by how some of the drafting process went in the other main committee I sat in on, which was the disarmament one, It was clear that the chair was in some places putting in draft language that was not going to be acceptable. And I think it was probably a matter of gauging what the majority view was and balancing that with the points which might not be acceptable to a small handful.

So perhaps they just got it wrong on that one, or perhaps the amendment process from the US, UK and Canadian side That involved the chair wasn't as strongly fought, if you will.

Jeffrey 29:26

So you're being really careful, but, but you're, you're, we're, we're, we're moving to what I really want to ask, right? Which is, I mean, it seems to me that, that Ambassador Faruqi and the nuclear weapon states didn't have a good working relationship and that that Led to the appearance of things that, at least from an outsider, regardless of whether I'm more sympathetic in some cases to the non-nuclear weapon states, if you put a poison pill in, you have to know it's a poison pill and you have to know it's going to blow up.

And so I'm just curious about – I mean, I don't know. Were there hard feelings about how the thing was actually playing out? Or was this doomed from the start? Do you know what I'm asking?

Andrea 30:17

Yeah, there were definitely procedural irritations between... Some of the nuclear weapon states and the chair, not only of the whole conference, but of the committees and the subsidiary bodies throughout, how influential that was in determining what the chair put in draft texts and or didn't, I'm not sure. But this wasn't the procedural bust up anyways, that it was, for example, in the 2005 review conference, which was just a procedural mess that cannot, I think, be rivaled.

But yeah, how that played out in this review conference in terms of personal dynamics with the chair, I don't know.

Aaron 31:00

Yeah, no, I mean it just – I guess it just raises a question for me about where this is going. I mean so ultimately the WMD free zone is what led to sort of the failure of this REVCON. Was there a sense that you're going to pick this back up again? I mean that there was any movement on this?

Was this simply Egypt sort of picking up what Jeffrey said, inserting a poison pill that perhaps that they had no fallback position to I guess try and salvage it? I mean I guess I would have a better word.

Andrea 31:35

I mean one of the other possibilities here is that Egypt and others who really wanted to take a strong line on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East – Thought that they had another opportunity in the near term. And perhaps they saw the General Assembly in the autumn as being that very opportunity. And of course, the General Assembly is not consensus-based.

And Egypt was arguing for a position that undermined consensus working for the process of establishing a conference on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. So maybe they just want to pursue something completely different and not... Be at the mercy of the US, UK, Canada, and whoever else might come out of that woodwork at the General Assembly in the autumn.

That's a possibility.

Jeffrey 32:26

Well, let me ask about, I mean, you mentioned opportunity, and I still struggle to get my head around how much of this is, how much of the Egyptian diplomacy on this issue is intended to secure a deliverable That is, you know, sort of, I don't know what you'd say, strengthening to Egypt security and, and how much of it is the political piece of wanting to be seen as being critical of Israel's status outside of the NPT.

Because it seems to me if you have a conference and it's not operated on consensus. And so the Israelis stay home and The participants all condemn the Israelis for having nuclear weapons and they articulate a convention on weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East and maybe they even all sign it and the Israelis simply refuse.

It doesn't seem to me that it ends up addressing any key Egyptian security issues. And so I always kind of go back and forth. I mean how much of that is just the Egyptians wanting to – I think it was Aaron who alluded to this – maintain their place in the conference and in the non-aligned movement and how much of it is they actually think that they could achieve something in this process?

Aaron 33:52

Yeah, just one more thing to add to that. I mean, and that by inserting these poison pills, are they not undercutting the very fundamental sort of policy item that they're trying to enact, which is actually a WMD-free zone in the Middle East? And so I always just come back to this sort of problem I see with their hardline position is that by pushing such a hardline position, they're actually eroding the chances of the outcome that they're seeking to achieve.

Andrea 34:22

I actually completely agree. And Jeff, I have similar suspicions about what the motivations might be for the Egyptians behaving in a way that includes, I think, a lot of posturing. And the one thing I'll add was that I've been told on numerous occasions throughout the past few years that despite having made all this fuss about the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East initiative over the last few years, especially at the 2010 review conference, which resulted in the mandate for the Spanish coordinator, The Egyptians actually weren't that helpful in the process, weren't that helpful to the facilitators.

Jeffrey 35:07

They were also a little distracted.

Andrea 35:10

Well, true.

Jeffrey 35:11

There have been a couple of Egyptian governments since 2010.

Andrea 35:17

That's very true. But that adds to another question here. Is this, to some extent, autopilot on the part of MFA officials in Egypt who are allowed to go forth and yell because one of the objectives of what they're doing is really to demonstrate a policy position that shames the Israelis, for lack of a better term.

Jeffrey 35:42

Yeah, and I've certainly heard that, the sense that al-Sisi doesn't really care about this issue, so the Egyptian MFA is more or less operating... On its own without much oversight. I mean, it's not like U.S.-Egyptian relations at the moment are spectacular. But I just think it's kind of interesting that given that the president had sort of asserted a personal interest in the topic and given how difficult relations are, it's kind of interesting that the Egyptians went to the mat over this.

Andrea 36:20

And again, they might have, as that Western official said, overshot the runway. Who knows what they were intending to get out of this, but they got effectively nothing. And now it's a battle over who controls the narrative. Does the US succeed in convincing everyone that it was Egypt that killed the review conference? Or do the Egyptians succeed in convincing everyone that it was the UK and US and Canada?

Who were the intransigent ones on this?

Aaron 36:51

Well, at least Egypt stayed in the room this time. They didn't walk out. No, but I just see a fundamental problem disconnect between the language used and sort of the actual policy goal that's being – Put it out there. But I mean I guess the natural thing is like where do we go? I mean obviously that there was disagreement about this.

It sort of led in addition to what we were talking about earlier with the disarmament leg to a failure. Would you call anything different of a failure and sort of how do we pick up the pieces or what are the next steps, the future?

Andrea 37:27

Yeah, is this a failure? We have the same debates about how to measure success for review conferences, and I think you have to... Ask the same thing about failure in this instance, because for some states, the no outcome might very well have been better than the proposal that was on the table. It gives a justification to potentially pursue initiatives through other avenues, whether that's through ad hoc fora, if we're talking about a legal instrument, or even through the General Assembly.

Again, if you're talking about humanitarian initiative or even a WMD free zone in the Middle East.

Jeffrey 38:07

Because 2010 went reasonably well, I think a lot of – it's easy to forget that – I actually did the math on this once and now I don't remember. I think it's a majority of review conferences have not produced consensus documents that they – every five years they frequently fail.

Andrea 38:28

It's usually one-on-one-off, success, failure, success, failure.

Jeffrey 38:32

Ah, see, actual data. But to pick up Aaron's question about what's next, and maybe we should do them in reverse order, in terms of what's next or what do we do for the weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, I mean – It seems like, with no consensus document, does that mean that the process is dead or does that mean that the Finnish coordinator keeps trying?

And I have this sneaking suspicion, be careful what you wish for. I mean, would the Egyptians really be happy if the Israelis showed up at the conference and said, hey, you know how we said we wouldn't be the first to introduce nuclear weapons? Well, we have them and here are our conditions for getting rid of them. I mean, would they be better off?

So what are we going to do? And I don't know, what do you think we should do? Is this conference really a good idea?

Andrea 39:28

So on whether the Finnish coordinator keeps going, my sense is that he probably doesn't, not least because a whole group of the Middle East states that he was meant to be coordinating have said he's done. So it seems to me pretty clear that his mandate is probably not moving forward. Now, I'm less clear on whether or not there might be some mandate, again, potentially in the General Assembly, I'm not sure, or some sort of informal discussion that says that this initiative is still relevant and needs to be taken forward in some way.

But I think we're going to need another resolution somewhere in order to spell out the terms of that, because clearly the co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution, the Arab League, Egypt, Israel and Iran, don't agree on how this process should move forward from here. On whether Israel... On whether the Egyptians really want the Israelis to attend. Part of the reason that I think they're not so keen on their attendance is also because the Israelis insist that you can't create this WMD free zone instrument in a vacuum.

It's got to be linked to regional security dynamics. And until you see an improvement in regional security, and of course, Israel sees a Threats that it regards as potentially existential, until that security environment improves, you cannot expect to have a WMD-free zone either negotiated or effectively implemented. And that's an agenda issue because the Israelis want to see regional security issues put on an agenda for a conference, and others don't.

So that was part of the tussle that would be conference as well.

Aaron 41:29

Well, I mean, so I guess like this naturally just leads to sort of the beginning of the conversation that we're having. I mean, so that's next on the WMD free zone. And what about the disarmament leg? I mean, because that was clearly a big thing. Obviously, the initial disagreement that led to the help contribute to the collapse of the conference.

Andrea 41:48

Yeah, I think it's 107 states that have now signed on to the newly renamed humanitarian pledge, changing the name from the Austrian pledge. So you've got a majority of states in the world that have said they want to start negotiating a legal instrument to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. And in all likelihood, they'll push to do that in some way before the next review conference.

I'm not sure yet what sort of forum they might go for. The Austrians have experience with ad hoc processes outside of the UN system, but others might insist that it's got to be Started in a UN context. Of course, in either case, nuclear weapon states are just not going to bite on this. And the idea that it would be a pressure tactic to compel for the disarmament, I think, is also perhaps slightly idealistic.

I don't know what you guys think. But Despite that, I would imagine that that group of states will probably push to start negotiating something.

Jeffrey 42:57

I can't tell if that's a happy note or not. I think it's not a happy note. I think we're in trouble.

Andrea 43:03

I'm hopeful of the value of that sort of move at the current time, but that's maybe a discussion for a whole other podcast.

Jeffrey 43:13

Now that would mean we could have you back on again.

Andrea 43:16

Would love it. Hey, Andrea.

Jeffrey 43:18

Oh, go ahead. Did you want to say something?

Aaron 43:20

No, just saying it'd be great to have you back on.

Jeffrey 43:22

Yeah. Yeah. Hey, Andrea, thank you for joining us.

Andrea 43:25

Thanks for having me.

Jeffrey 43:26

Hey, thanks for listening. As always, if you like the podcast, leave us a review on iTunes. It helps get the word out.