Arms Control Wonk ArmsControlWonk

 

Scott Sagan wrote a typically fine essay in the Spring 2000 issue of International Security on “The Commitment Trap.” His subject was the Bush administration’s use of “calculated ambiguity” to deter Saddam Hussein from using chemical or biological weapons in the run-up to the second Gulf war. After disavowing chemical weapons (1992) as well as biological weapons (1972), senior U.S. officials have sought to deter their use by others by issuing warnings of “absolutely overwhelming” and “devastating” responses. These code words imply the use of nuclear weapons.

Scott argued, persuasively in my view, that veiled threats to use nuclear weapons trapped U.S. officials. If CW or BW were actually used by an adversary — regardless of their scope and military effectiveness, whether from top-down dictates or breakdowns in command and control — Washington could feel impelled to carry out its threat, thereby inviting immeasurable but significant costs to its international stranding and to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Alternatively, by refraining from carrying out its nuclear threat, Washington could also lose international standing, inviting new adversaries to call its bluff and old friends to question the protectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. To avoid these awful choices, Scott proposed that calculated ambiguity be replaced with a clear and credible U.S. commitment to respond to CW and BW use with prompt and devastating conventional retaliation.

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Last week, I was lucky to be able to join NPT PrepCom-ers in Geneva to help present the recently completed UNIDIR study ‘A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament,’ carried out by Pavel Podvig, Phillip Schell, and myself.

The work is accessible on the recently launched nuclearforces.org website, where you can check out the overview report, the individual country reports, some nifty maps, or download the KMZ set.

As the P5 continue to seek ways to show up on their 2010 Action Plan commitments (especially those repeatedly mentioned by name that are related to disarmament, transparency, and reporting - Action 5, 20, & 21), the aim of this project was to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of applying New START definitions and provisions more widely to the other NPT nuclear weapon states.  Yes, New START was specifically designed for the arsenals of Russia and the United States, so why would we do such a thing?  The overview report says it best:

Even though the New START transparency and accountability provisions were developed in the context of bilateral US–Russian nuclear arms control, they could be applied to the nuclear arsenals of other nuclear-weapon states. The key advantage of New START is that it provides a legal and organizational framework for nuclear reductions that has been thoroughly tested in practice. Extending this framework to all nuclear-weapon states would be a natural and direct way of building a comprehensive system that could ensure transparency and accountability in nuclear disarmament.

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Another installment of the best (and only) regular ACW post!

The White House | “…varying degrees of confidence that the Syrian regime has used [sarin] on a small scale…” Joseph Holliday says that Assad has outfoxed Obama.

Nature | From prison in Iran, a graduate student writes that he refused to work on a laser-based enrichment program meant for military purposes.

Yonhap News | North Korea has moved two Scud missile launchers to its east coast.  Should we be afraid?

38 North | Still no missile tests, but North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric keeps escalating. Byung Chul Lee makes the case for engagement.  Related: Jeffrey Lewis makes the case for taking the nuclear threat at face value. Elbridge Colby makes the case for reasserting U.S. nuclear deterrence.

The Sun | Where Kim Jong-un learned theatrics.

CTBTO | Radioactivity detected after North Korea’s February 12th nuclear test confirms that the test occurred. Time to update this website?

The New York Times | James Acton asks, is China changing its position on nuclear weapons? No, says Yao Yunzhu. No, says M. Taylor Fravel.  No, says Gregory Kulacki, and let’s stop nagging them about it.  (Acton responds to Yao and Fravel. Rachel Oswald reviews the debate.)

New Statesman | Kate Hudson of the UK’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament thinks the U.S. will make Britain give up its nukes. Maybe as soon as the U.S. finishes cutting a leg off the Triad?

Washington Post | Champion of fiscal restraint Lindsey Graham (here is his voting record) is up in arms about another spending cut.  No history of pork there.  But that’d be great.

We hope you enjoyed this installment of FYRP.

 
 

What do we really know about Iran’s capability to reconvert triuranium octoxide (U3O8) enriched to 20% U-235 back into UF6 feedstock that can be further enriched to produce weapon-grade uranium? Can Iran do it? And if so, how fast?

The answer matters considerably, as Iran, Israel, and the P5+1 will make decisions this year, based in part on their assessment of risk, about the fate of current efforts to negotiate a comprehensive crisis settlement.

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A few thoughts on where we are with the allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria.

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George Bunn, a gentle spirit with a fixed resolve to help make the world less hospitable to nuclear weapons, died on Sunday. In an earlier post, I referred to George as a norm builder — one facet of a life well-lived. Some of the others can be found in this obituary released by Stanford University:

George Bunn, one of the world’s most revered advocates for a world without nuclear weapons and a consulting professor at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation for two decades, has died.

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In an earlier post and in an op-ed published by the International Herald Tribune on April 5th, I’ve likened the nuclear competition on the subcontinent to Aesop’s fable about the tortoise and the hare. Here’s the language I used in the IHT piece:

Pakistan, whose economy and domestic cohesion are steadily worsening, is the hare, racing to devote scarce resources to compete with a country whose economy is nine times as great. India is the tortoise. Its nuclear program is moving steadily forward without great exertion. The tortoise will win this race, and could quicken its pace. But the hare continues to run fast, because nuclear weapons are a sign of strength amidst growing domestic weaknesses and because it can’t keep up with the growth of India’s conventional military programs.

I’ve heard back from colleagues in Pakistan who object to my analysis. One basis for complaint is that I lack sensitivity by comparing Pakistan to a hare. I did not mean to offend; my purpose in writing was to shed light on how hard Pakistan is competing. My op-ed suggested the not-so-novel recommendation of greatly expanded cross-border trade with India to help defuse this competition.

The second basis for complaint is that I have mischaracterized India as a tortoise. The message I’ve heard – not for the first time — is that India is forcing the pace in both nuclear and conventional capabilities, compelling Pakistan to run this race.

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Another installment of your new favorite post!

National Journal | It’s starting to feel like Fall 2001 all over again, says George Condon, Jr., what with terrorism and all in the USA. I may be young, George, but it’s really nothing like then.

Korea Herald | North Korea is not poised to attack the South, says senior U.S. military official, notwithstanding all the sound and fury. Also, more on missiles and nukes from DNI James Clapper. Remember this missile-test footage?

Taiwan Focus | China has not yet deployed either the JL-2 SLBM or the DF-41 road-mobile, multi-warhead ICBM, says senior Taiwan military official. (h/t Global Security Newswire)

Xinhua | China has released a new defense white paper about “peacetime employment of armed forces.” This is the full document.

Global Security Newswire | Arab League foreign ministries might not boycott the 2013 NPT PrepCom after all, Elaine Grossman reports.

Associated Press | Iran installs more IR-2m centrifuges. This should spark some debate.

The Times | Porton Down scientists allegedly find evidence of Syria CW use… not otherwise specified. (Teaser only for non-subscribers. Here’s the gist.) The Syrian government is preventing further investigation.

RIA Novosti | Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin says that U.S. BMD “poses no military threat” to Russia. Apparently, the asteroid threat takes precedence. We should call in these guys.

We hope that this news dose can last until the next FYRP.

 
 

Every war must end, but few end well. Fred Charles Iklé has written a slim but essential book on this subject. Fred’s bottom line: government leaders that make momentous decisions to go to war, or decisions that could lead to war, are obliged to have military and diplomatic strategies to end hostilities on favorable terms.

In the preface to the first revised edition to Every War Must End (1971), Fred lists three “musts” for US decision makers:

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Over the years, I’ve been very interested in North Korea’s development of a new IRBM — called variously the SS-N-6 (US designation of a Soviet precursor system), the Musudan (US designation of the DPRK version) and the BM-25 (used in reference to kits allegedly exported from the DPRK to Iran), as well as a few other names.

The new IRBM is interesting because it represents a better base technology, in terms of more energetic propellants, than the Scud.  One of the big debates about the community of people interested in North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities turns on the level of North Korean competence.  Do they do it themselves?  Do they have help?  How far can they stretch and stack what are basically Scuds?

And now, does this new technology open up new possibilities, like a three-stage road-mobile ICBM?

Some, like Robert Schmucker and Markus Schiller, are skeptical.  In our comments, Markus expressed his doubts:

[My] first impression by reading open source literature is either that the Musudan is based on the SS-N-6 because everybody knows that NK mastered SS-N-6 technology, or that NK mastered SS-N-6 technology because everybody knows that the Musudan is based on the SS-N-6. This is not a good starting point for further analysis. Remember: In assessments, it is way too easy for the author to confuse “we know” with “we think we know”!

As for me, I find this is a bit unfair — quite a lot of people, especially on this site, have spent plenty of time musing over whether the SS-N-6/BM-25/Musudan was just a paper missile or not. We’ve spent too much time trying to separate what “we know” from what
we think we know” to be accused of being confused. Wrong? Sure, it happens. Confused?  Not so much.

So let me recount what we know, and think we know, about the SS-N-6 aka Musudan aka BM-25.

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