I’ve spent a lot of time over the past month or so on planes to disarmament conferences and planes to non-proliferation conferences, and on one of those journeys (to Geneva, in fact!) I (re)read something that made a very deep impression on me. It was from the debate in International Affairs last year about the future of the NPT. In his July rejoinder to the series of articles in the May 2007 issue, William Walker (who can hardly be described as a Bomb-lover) says this:
…the more profound difficulty is that, precisely because the NPT is a disarmament treaty, the Treaty and its Conferences can neither ascribe value to nuclear deterrence nor countenance discussion of it, irrespective of the importance that leading powers and their allies attach to it, and irrespective of the role that it might play in paving the way for deep arms reductions or disarmament. To pay open homage to nuclear deterrence is to jeopardize the non-proliferation norm and regime. Nuclear deterrence is always the ghost at the table whose presence is understood but whose contribution to regional and global security cannot openly be acknowledged or weighed. A reluctant acceptance of this presence by most states, if seldom by Israel’s neighbours, has been part of the NPT’s essential pragmatism.
This argument strikes me as being very true and deeply problematic. Here’s a recent practical illustration of this from my own experience…
One important step toward disarmament is the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe and Turkey. Might Turkey, however, not interpret this move as a signal that NATO is no longer committed to its defence and, as a result, develop its own Bomb?
Many of you have heard this question before. My aim here is not answer it (I don’t claim to be able to). What I want to say is that this argument, and ones like it, need to be taken seriously. After all, if the removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey did result in it acquiring some of its own, it would be a catastrophe for disarmament. I pick this example because on a number of recent occasions I have heard this argument simply dismissed by disarmament advocates (of which I consider myself one). It worries me as I don’t see how we can prevent proliferation and advance disarmament if we can’t even discuss this issue. Yet, as Walker points out, the discussion of deterrence is seemingly impossible within the NPT context.
Enough naval gazing… For an interesting recent take on US-Turkish relations see this recent report for the Senate on possible proliferation in the Middle East.
What you are really getting at here is the talking point that says “U.S. nuclear weapons policy strengthens our nonproliferation goals because, if we did not provide credible security guarantees to our allies, they might want to acquire their own nuclear weapons.” First, although those who have adopted this talking point tend to refer to “U.S. friends and allies” in the aggregate, it is worth remembering that the United States provides a wide range of security assurances and security assistance to its friends and allies, and does not rely soley on the nuclear umbrella to guarantee their security. Second, it is even more important to note that the U.S. does not provide nuclear security guarantees to all of its allies, so one cannot argue that concerns about U.S. extended nuclear deterrence would affect the proliferation calculus of all U.S. allies. The only nations that sit under the U.S. nuclear umbrella are those in NATO (which includes Turkey), Japan, S. Korea, and Australia. So, if you are concerned that a weakening of the U.S. nuclear guarantee would spur proliferation, you’d have to limit the concern to nations who actually have a nuclear guarantee. This concern, then, really boils down to only Turkey and Japan, and, really, only Japan, because Turkey has the rest of the NATO security apparatus to call on. Also, even in the case of Japan and Turkey, its very limiting to think that the only reason they don’t go nuclear is because of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Our security relationship is broader than just our nuclear guarantee, and their nuclear calculus depends on more than just our nuclear guarantee.
And, as for your opening comment, deterrence and nuclear deterrence are not the same thing. One can quite credibly talk about deterrence, and security assurances, within the NPT or a disarmament framework, as long as one realizes that one can deter (i.e. impose high costs for an attack, or deny the benefits of an attack), with weapons or policies that my not be nuclear….
“It worries me as I don’t see how we can prevent proliferation and advance disarmament if we can’t even discuss this issue.”
Well, it worries me and I don’t see how we can prevent proliferation and advance disarmament if we keep talking about how worried we are exclusively about muslim countries.
Look at your last few posts: Iran, Egpyt, and now the worry is Turkey!
Pathetic bias.
I might as well stick to reading the NYTimes.
Jeff: this one is not very hard to figure out. Taking your NATO nuclear weapons example, one needs to examine whether the continued deployment of the 400 some U.S. tactical bombs at various NATO bases is actually deterring a nuclear or nonnuclear attack by an enemy of NATO or Turkey? If not, do they realistically serve any other military mission? The answer to both at this point is “no.” In fact, NATO itself has acknowledged that these weapons only serve as a “symbol” of NATO unity and cohesion. Now, would removal of forward-deployed tactical nukes at NATO bases really erode Turkey’s confidence of the alliance’s commitment to come to its defense? Would it erode confidence so much that Turkey would risk becoming an international outcast and a real target of somebody by building its own nuclear arsenal? I think not. Don’t forget that the rationale for these NATO nukes was to add credibility to the threat that NATO would resort to a nuclear attack to stop a conventional Soviet land invasion. NATO’s biggest problems today are IED’s in Afghanistan and riots in Kosovo.
We can hope that the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Turkey would be accompanied by discussions of Turkey’s defense with appropriate assurances. In any case, the placement of nukes in Turkey was never solely intended for Turkey’s defense, as Daryl Kimball points out.
“Nuclear deterrence” – the concept – was developed as part of the Cold War’s nuclear rivalry between two BIG nuclear powers. As has been noted here, deterrence can take many non-nuclear forms. And nuclear deterrence simply doesn’t work against many of today’s threats.
As to proliferation, does nuclear deterrence work? We’ll nuke you if you try to get nukes? This is certainly a good line of discussion to be avoided in the context of the NPT.
So what you’ve got here is more Cold War leftovers. You’ve pulled it out of the back of the refrigerator, and it didn’t pass the nineteen-year test.
“One important step toward disarmament is the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe and Turkey. Might Turkey, however, not interpret this move as a signal that NATO is no longer committed to its defence and, as a result, develop its own Bomb?”
Sure…if it was 1965.
The removal of US weapons from NATO NNWS would be a key signal by the United States – it will do more to advance the nuclear disarmament debate and thereby strengthening the nonproliferation side of the coin than the current lip service to “achieve a vision of a nuclear weapons free world.” Agreement was reached in 2000 that by non-strategic weapon systems will be reduced. Not only has very little (if anything) been done to implement this part of the 13 steps, but it the emphasis have shifted from a US (and Russian) decision to do so, to a scenario where NATO NNWS appear to have the ability to decided whether or not to have US weapons on thier territories. More often do we hear from senior US officials that the decision to remove these warheads is not that of the US, but that of NATO allies. While the negotiating history of Art 1 of the NPT may show some differences in interpretation over what constitute “nuclear sharing, “Art 2 is very clear that NNWS may not receive nuclear explosive devices. In fact if the decision is no longer that of the US, then does this not mean a serious breach of compliance by NATO NNWS? Moreover, is it not ironic that key European NNWS are critical of Iran’s nuclear posture, but they seem to ignore the fact the fact that the weapons on their territories are no longer targeted east, but south instead? The potential installation of missile defense systems in Poland and the Chech Republic further compounds concerns about aggressive postures towards countries such as Iran. Given its proximity to Iran, and the security implications of a nuclear Iran, Turkey would be best served to have the warheads removed. In terms of the NATO statute, Turkey would still enjoy protection from the US nuclear umbrella, while at the same time signaling not only to Iran, but to other states that it does not rely on nuclear weapons fro its security.