My alter ego, Chauncey Gardiner, joins me (again) for this post, which is prompted, no doubt, by an August spent pulling weeds in the bog garden and thinking/writing about U.S.-Pakistan nuclear relations.
The long-running dispute over IAEA inspector designations stands out in the latest report on Iran. Iran rejects inspectors. The IAEA is not happy with it. But who is right and who is wrong? As so often, there are no easy answers.
According to Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il used his visit to China to express his desire to return to the Six-Party Talks. But skepticism abounds. In Wednesday’s Washington Post, Chico Harlan reported that nameless U.S. officials thought it “notable” that KCNA, the official North Korean news agency, had failed to carry the same message.
So, how carefully have the anonymous officials or Mr. Harlan been reading KCNA?
Has anyone written a great book that covers the complex relationship between religion and the Bomb? Please help me out here. I can’t think of one. The subject is so rich for so many reasons, that whoever writes brilliantly about how religion has shaped the approach/avoidance of nuclear weapons in different societies deserves to become the next Richard Rhodes. Book projects are hereby solicited.
Some of the most informative and provocative reporting on nuclear proliferation and policy to be found these days emerges from the keyboard of the Wall Street Journal’s Jay Solomon. More’s the pity, then, when he seems to be cutting corners. Tuesday’s article on Jon Byong-ho and Yun Ho-jin — the Dynamic Duo of North Korean missile and nuclear exports — looks like one of those times.
If you are interested in the technical details regarding Iran’s Qiam ballistic missile — or really, in how to estimate the measurements of a ballistic missile from photographs — you really ought to be reading the comments to my post, Schmucker/Schiller on Iran’s Qiam.
It is pretty much the most impressive thing I ever seen in blog comments. You people are amazing.
B61 computer simulation. Image credit: Sandia National Laboratory
Growing up in Albuquerque, New Mexico during the Cold War meant that I had a lot of friends whose parents worked at Sandia National Labs (SNL) doing “nuclear bomb things”, or whatever vague description they’d get out of their parents about what was paying the bills. Things are somewhat more transparent these days, of course. For example, without revealing anything classified, the lab and the NNSA regularly provide updates on various LEPs; this year, SNL revealed some specifics regarding their refurbishment work on the B61 mod 7 and 11.
Over the past year or so, the B61 has been a topic of interest for several reasons. For one thing, the B61 was a prominent star in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which mentioned plans for “a full-scope B61 LEP study and follow-on activities”, as well as the intention to make the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter capable of carrying it.
Our friends Robert Schmucker and Markus Schiller send along a short note on Iran’s Qiam missile, concluding that it is a test bed for a new guidance system that will eventually find its way in the Sejil.
A couple of weeks ago I summarized here that Saudi Arabia was moving ahead with plans to do nuclear power and that there were some potential issues.
In July, after having read that some weighty nuclear industry companies were trying to dip their toes into Arabian sands, I talked this over with some people who know their way around Riyadh.