Since testing nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan has lost while India has gained regional and international standing. Pakistan has also become less confident of its national security as the United States has gravitated toward India and as Pakistan’s own ties with states in the region have frayed. This wasn’t supposed to happen: Pakistan tested nuclear devices and has expanded its nuclear stockpile to improve its security and profile. Understanding why these objectives are receding is crucial to Pakistan’s well-being and to figuring out why Islamabad’s talking points have fallen on deaf ears in foreign capitals. Blaming misfortune on the lure of India’s market is too convenient an excuse. India most certainly gains sway because of its market, but the profit motive does not explain why Pakistan has lost the benefit of the doubt abroad.
Let’s begin the search for an explanation with a minor, but indicative example. A standard Pakistani talking point is that it tested nuclear devices for national security, while India tested for prestige. This unassailable truth within Pakistan is widely dismissed by those who follow the nuclear competition in southern Asia. In actuality, Pakistan was ahead of India in 1998 in terms of operationalizing its nuclear capabilities, thanks to help from China. New Delhi felt compelled to test to deal with its nuclear-armed neighbors, and because doors were closing with the indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the negotiation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
In other words, New Delhi tested nuclear devices for reasons of national security – just like Pakistan, which quickly tested after India did. And yes, pride and prestige factored into New Delhi’s decision, as authors like George Perkovich (India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, 1999) have written. But pride and prestige factored into Pakistan’s calculus of decision as well.
This is a minor matter, but it speaks to the first principle of trying to influence outsiders: know your audience. People who work on these issues figuratively roll their eyes when they hear this Pakistani talking point. And then discount the other messages they hear – even when the speaker has legitimate, important points to make.
Now extrapolate this dynamic to more important issues, like the activities of groups with links to Pakistan’s military and intelligence services that have engaged in acts of violence against India and Afghanistan. Foreign capitals view Pakistan through the prism of these groups and the actions they have taken. Pakistan’s talking points about being the victim of violent extremism and paying penalties for going to war against the Pakistani Taliban are completely true. But they are eroded with every additional attack against an Indian military outpost and with every firefight launched by the Haqqani network in Afghanistan. These actions belie Pakistan’s talking point that it does not differentiate between good and bad groups that engage in militancy.
Now let’s back up a bit: Pakistan has very good reasons for possessing a nuclear deterrent. It lost its eastern wing after a war with India in 1971, and it has no way to compete with India’s economic dynamism. So why do foreign capitals raise concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent while saying so little about India’s? Primarily because Pakistan combines nuclear deterrence with providing safe havens for groups that engage in cross-border violence.
When Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold, Rawalpindi had the choice of shutting down militant, anti-India groups because they were no longer needed to keep India at bay – or using its deterrent as a backdrop to step up a campaign to change the status quo in Kashmir. Rawalpindi chose poorly. Until Pakistan reverses this choice, it will continue to lose traction.
Much of the external criticism of Pakistan’s nuclear posture now focuses on its embrace of very short-range, nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and perhaps other types of nuclear weapons that must be located very close to the forward edge of battle to have any deterrent or military effect. These types of nuclear weapons are inherently the hardest to keep safe and secure. If Pakistan’s political and military leaders were to act in tandem against anti-India militant groups, war-fighting scenarios would become superfluous, and international attention would shift from critiquing to helping Pakistan. This happened when Rawalpindi turned against the Pakistani Taliban, and it can happen again.
As long as this choice is postponed, Pakistan will not receive sympathy for its security dilemmas. Every crisis on the subcontinent since the 1998 tests, starting with the Kargil War, has been triggered by events that can be traced back to Pakistan, or to the Pakistani side of the Kashmir divide. After the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attack, Islamabad promised to shut down militant anti-India groups. These promises were not kept. There was plentiful evidence in both cases that the perpetrators maintained ties with Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. Judicial prosecution didn’t happen after the Parliament attack and was half-hearted and unsuccessful after the 2008 Mumbai attack. Pakistan blamed this failure on India’s not handing over more evidence – evidence that wasn’t admissible in Pakistani courts. Pakistan’s talking point that it needs more help collecting evidence from India might usefully be retired.
Because of this recent history, foreign capitals reached the conclusion that Pakistan’s decision-makers were unwilling or unable to bring the militant wings of anti-India groups to heel. This impression was reinforced when the perpetrators remained free to give speeches, gain recruits, and collect money.
Nuclear-tinged crises on the subcontinent override Pakistan’s talking points about the unfairness of Partition and the need to address the Kashmir dispute. Major powers understand that India has made a mess for itself in the Kashmir Valley. But the UN Security Council has shown little or no interest in entering this fray. It has not passed a resolution on Kashmir to Pakistan’s liking since 1957.
There are much bigger messes in this war-torn world, and the international community has not tried to clean them up, either. The UN and key foreign capitals care more about the prospect of a clash between India and Pakistan than about Kashmir. The UN Security Council will react with alacrity to the prospect of another war between India and Pakistan, but it will not react to India’s poor record of governance in Kashmir – just as it will not react to Pakistan’s poor record of governance in Baluchistan. Both are now deemed to be internal matters, which is one reason why Pakistani calls for a plebiscite in Kashmir have fallen on deaf ears. Every time major powers have gotten involved to prevent a clash between India and Pakistan over the past quarter-century, they have sought to reaffirm the status quo in Kashmir, not change it more to Pakistan’s liking.
Whenever there is an attack on an Indian military post, Islamabad argues that there is insufficient proof that the usual suspects are guilty. This talking point has no traction. In the court of international public opinion, the burden of proof shifted from New Delhi to Islamabad after the Kargil War, the 2001-02 “Twin Peaks” crisis, and the 2008 Mumbai crisis. Until Pakistan takes long-promised steps to shut down the militant wings of anti-India groups, Islamabad will not regain the benefit of the doubt abroad.
The usual suspects were presumed guilty abroad after the Uri attack because alternative explanations for who was to blame were not persuasive beyond Pakistan’s borders. The explanation that disaffected Kashmiris carried out these attacks without help from Pakistan had few takers. Disaffected Kashmiris need help to carry out sophisticated attacks against Indian military installations. Homegrown Kashmiri disaffection is now very much a reality, but is taking other forms. Perhaps the modus operandi of Kashmiris will change in the future, but as of now, they are not the primary suspects.
Another talking point, widely shared in Pakistan, is that Indian forces killed their own comrades to change the subject away from human-rights abuses in Kashmir and pin the blame on Pakistan. When Pakistanis advance this argument, foreign capitals react in utter disbelief.
The most plausible explanation abroad for attacks on Indian military outposts is the most obvious one: that these attacks are carried out by groups based in the Punjab that hate India and are incensed by what is happening in the Kashmir Valley. These groups have cadres on the Pakistani side of the Kashmir divide. When these cadres cross the Line of Control to carry out attacks, they do so with the knowledge, if not the active support, of Pakistani military and intelligence personnel. Indeed, if local commanders do not know about the presence of these cadres and their preparations to cross the Kashmir divide, they are unfit to hold these positions.
Rawalpindi has received high marks for the counterinsurgency campaign waged against the Pakistani Taliban, overriding foot-dragging by political leaders. Because of this campaign, deadly explosions on Pakistani soil have been greatly reduced. Groups active in attacks across the Kashmir divide and in Afghanistan have been outside the ambit of this campaign. Turning against these groups will mean more explosions, but not turning against these groups will also increase internal-security concerns, while compounding Pakistan’s international woes.
This choice is obviously a lose-lose proposition, but postponing this choice even longer won’t make it any easier. Pakistan will lose more by pursuing the same policies and by relying on the same old talking points than by changing course. The hard, unavoidable truth is that Pakistan can only achieve internal security and international credibility by taking overt steps against the usual suspects.
Biased reporting. One sided view. Ignoring Pakistan challenges created by US war on terror. Pakistan sacrificed all and India gets to eat the cake. This is what happened.
Extremely moderate reporting.
In the US its a common belief that Osama Bin Laden could not have resided within a couple of kilometers of the Pakistani military academy without knowledge and active support of the Pakistani Military especially the ISI. Be glad we ignore our common beliefs.
Again, one more of Pakistan’s long standing viewpoint that after the Afghan War against the USSR, Pakistan was left holding the bag along with Afghan refugees. And that after the recent war on terrorism, Pakistan again is somehow the victim. This is not only factually true or credible, but is now increasingly tiresome.
The whole 9/11 happened precisely because Pakistan propped up and supported the Afghan Taliban Government which in turn, with the tactical approval of ISI, Pakistan’s Intelligence, gave safe haven to Osama Bin Laden whose Al Qaeda planned and executed one of the most deadliest terrorist attack on the twin towers, right at the heart of the American Soil.
Let us not forget where Osama Bin Laden was ultimately found to be hiding: Abbotabad, the West Point of Pakistan.
Thus, the US war on terror itself is the direct result of Pakistan’s Dilly-dallying or even close embrace of Terrorism as state policy. NOT the other way around
Would you say people are biased against North Korea?
What accounts for bias?
MK
A very perceptive article by Michael Krepon. I hope the military leaders of Pakistan will heed the advice given: “Pakistan will lose more by pursuing the same policies and by relying on the same old talking points than by changing course. The hard, unavoidable truth is that Pakistan can only achieve internal security and international credibility by taking overt steps against the usual suspects.”
Let the truth be bare that Mr MK it apoears has accepted India’s job, otherwise how could he combine nuclear issues with terrorism in a blatant manner. There is consistent narrative in all his writings about Pakistan…..he seems to be eroding his hard earned life long stature of a scholar by presenting coloured views…..Cannot he see gross HR violations in Kashmir, cannot he fathom the rise of safron terrorism…..just a matter of time when India and US will be subsumed by it…..I wish him better sense
Yes. This is exactly why Pakistan is no longer taken seriously and you are proving the Author’s point. If any credible scholar rises pertinent points on why Pakistan is living in denial, you are quick to respond with allegations of bias instead of addressing the points raised.
A subtle Ad Hominem that suggest that the integrity of the Author is up for sale and that he/she has sold it to India.
Also, please don’t raise ‘Saffron Terrorism’ as a bogeyman. That Boogie frightens no-one.
Terrible article, because it defines “crises” very selectively. The Indian record in Kashmir is objectively far worse than pakistan’s own (atrocious) record in Balochistan; rapes and state-sanctioned murders have been common. Somehow this is not defined as a crisis.
The United States invasion of Afghanistan, which was relatively stable in the autumn of 2001 (as admitted by numerous writers, including Carter Malkasian, Nabi Misdaq, Mike Martin, Gilles Dorronsoro), is somehow not defined as a crisis.
Nor is the Bangladesh government’s murderous crackdown on its opposition.
This is as ridiculous as (for instance) blaming the United States for Syria’s murderous crackdown on its own cities, or blaming Iran for Saudi Arabia’s aerial bombardment in Yemen, or blaming the Muslim Brotherhood for Egypt’s brutal repression, or blaming the West for Russia and Iran’s crackdowns on their dissidents. A pathetically bad article by a writer with an axe to grind.
> A pathetically bad article by a writer with an axe to grind.
Why is there a pattern with every Pakistani commentator trying to raise doubts about the Author’s integrity? This is pathological. The Pakistani mindset is becoming increasingly paranoid raising conspiracy theories at almost any incident or even article critical of it.
Uri? Indian security’s black flag ops.
Mumbai Attacks? India’s own operations intended to pin them on Pakistan
Parliament Attacks? India’s orchestrated own.
India’s greatest strength is that its population is exposed to myriad of voices, opinions and ideologies and the people now instinctively know that there are many sides to an story. Pakistanis tend to rely on a singular narrative created by its deep state and tend to dismiss every other opinion, however well supported by facts and logic, reasoned and presented, that they are mini-conspiracies.
i think your view is also biased as you seem to have no direct knowledge of borh of these countries
Unless the Pakistan ‘awam’ throws the Army out of governance, situation is likely to deteriorate at a faster pace. Political leaders have yet to didplay their competence comes on handy for the military. Cursed nation for no fault of people. Poor leadership since birth, one only hopes the future is better with no ostensible signs unfortunately.
Michael everyone is entitled to his or her views and your commitment to non-proliferation though far above Pakistan’s ‘sins’ is well known but deliberate use of expressions such as “Rawalpindi’s Nuclear programs” is mischievous to say the least and totally unfair. Does US have any face to lecture other countries on ‘CTBT’?
Rabs:
The US deserves brickbats for not ratifying the CTBT. One of our political parties is in tear-down mode, and it takes both major political parties to get the two-thirds vote set by the U.S. Constitution to consent to ratification. I hope that the Republican Party will regain its moorings for many reasons — the CTBT being one of them.
Let me explain my references to Rawalpindi. As those who have been edited by me will know, I object to the usage of the name of a country to describe a complex decision or action. Example: The United States decided to go to war in Iraq after 9/11. Yes, in a broad sense this is true, but this usage of a country name obliterates how convoluted and contorted this decision was. It would be better, in my view, to say or to write that the George W. Bush administration decided to wage a war of choice against Iraq, and enough of the American public, still reeling from 9/11, agreed.
In the same spirit, I object to writing that says that “India” decided to do this and “Pakistan” decided to do that. I ask for more specificity, even when using shorthand. I write this way, too.
I am well aware that there is overwhelming support for Pakistan’s nuclear program within the country. But “Pakistan” didn’t decide it needed battlefield nuclear weapons; Rawalpindi did, and received widespread support. I understand that there is widespread revulsion and anger against India for its treatment of Kashmiri Muslims, as well as bitterness for the legacy of Partition. I would feel that way too, if I were a Pakistani. But “Pakistan” didn’t choose the policies to make India pay for the bitter legacy of Partition. These policies were championed by Pakistan’s military and intelligence services — and hence my shorthand, “Rawalpindi.” I realize that, at the outset, “Islamabad” was enthusiastic about these policies. (At least two, if not three generations of Bhuttos have talked about a thousand year campaign to liberate Kashmir, have they not?) In the main, however, the power to set policy on nuclear issues, India and Kashmir rests in uniform. The ability of political leaders to change policies in these areas rests on the consent of those in uniform. That’s why I use the shorthand “Rawalpindi” — not to be mischievous.
MK
The problem with Pakistanis simply is this-it has politco military aims far in excess of its own power, so a failure is guaranteed. Its strategic calculus is based on wishful thinking (one Pak soldier equal to 10 Indians et al while in reality a Brigade ACTUALLY surrendered to a company at Mymansingh in 1971 Dec). or China will intervene ……
The real danger is that Pak nukes are controlled by the military who (like me) are trained to think of ‘use’ and have only faint ideas on concepts of deterrence. This ought tobe the real worry for the world for Pak may well break the 72 year taboo on nuclear ‘use’ with Global anarchy as a result.
Pakistan is also a ‘warrior’ state on lines of Sparta, Assyrians, Turks and Mongols and with meet the same fate.
Michael,
Your justification to differentiate between Rawalpindi and Islamabad does not hold ground and remains mischievous at best. The objective is clear, well understood and is only intended to create a wedge.
On history? Never expected that a person well conversant with the region would twist the facts and change the narrative to please the ‘new found strategic partners’. Few questions that may merit revisiting history:
– What was the security threat to India in 1958 once Homi Bhabha made a statement that India could build a bomb in 18 months? This was a period of India-China close friendship and Pakistan was a close US partner in SEATO and CENTO (remember!!!)
– What was the security consideration for India to test its nuclear weapon in 1974? Those who were involved in 1974 tests from India themselves claim that it was a weapon test and not a PNE.
– Having tested a device in 1974 that led Pakistan to start its own weapon pursuit, India should have been technologically ahead of Pakistan. Are Indian scientists so incompetent that they could not capitalize on their early achievements and let Pakistan surpass them.
– India did try to test before 1998 as well but was stopped by the US. Testing was one of the main elements of BJPs manifesto and a long standing ambition of successive Indian leadership (recall I.K. Gujral’s statement of the third eye!!), and BJP followed their commitment. Nothing to do with Pakistan.
– Even if we consider that Pakistan was ahead of India technologically that forced India to test, then why was Pakistan offering several proposals to keep the region free of NWs, and India always rejecting those proposals? Stimson Center has a complete list of the proposals that Pakistan offered. One needs to refresh the history and the timelines.
You have also accused Pakistan of being responsible of every crisis starting from Kargil. The history of India-Pakistan conflict predates Kargil and includes Indian occupation of Siachin Glacier and the 1971 war also. Please recall PM Modi’s recent bluster that he actively supported terrorists in East Pakistan in 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh. A unique statement by a sitting Prime Minister who holds control of India’s NWs. It is not a distant history that the same person was not allowed to enter into the US for his alleged involvement in the massacre of Muslims in Gujrat.
How can one compare India’s poor record of governance in Kashmir with so called ‘poor record’ of Pakistan’s governance in Baluchistan? The two are distinctly different, one is a disputed territory accepted by the UN and the other is sovereign territory of Pakistan. It seems PM Modi’s analogy is now more important in Washington think tanks than the established facts.
Finally, seeing series of such articles emanating from Washington, one wonders if there will ever be peace in this part of the world. There seems to be a strong interest group wishing otherwise.
QUESTION (1): What was the security threat to India in 1958 once Homi Bhabha made a statement that India could build a bomb in 18 months? This was a period of India-China close friendship and Pakistan was a close US partner in SEATO and CENTO (remember!!!)
ANSWER (1): Homi Bhabha made that statement in 1964 and not in 1958. The India-China friendship phase ended with the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. That statement was specifically made in response to the Chinese nuclear test of 1964. Look it up.
QUESTION (2): What was the security consideration for India to test its nuclear weapon in 1974? Those who were involved in 1974 tests from India themselves claim that it was a weapon test and not a PNE.
ANSWER (2): During the 1971 war, the US sent a nuclear weapons fleet into the bay of Bengal to put pressure on India to agree to a ceasefire. Having felt threatened by nuclear weapons, India decided to carry out the nuclear tests in response. Look it up.
QUESTION (3): Having tested a device in 1974 that led Pakistan to start its own weapon pursuit, India should have been technologically ahead of Pakistan. Are Indian scientists so incompetent that they could not capitalize on their early achievements and let Pakistan surpass them.
ANSWER (3): Michael Krepon has already answered this. The Pakistani bomb was aided by China and this allowed Pakistan to leapfrog India. This clandestine nuclear aid from China is well-documented. Look it up.
QUESTION (4): India did try to test before 1998 as well but was stopped by the US. Testing was one of the main elements of BJPs manifesto and a long standing ambition of successive Indian leadership (recall I.K. Gujral’s statement of the third eye!!), and BJP followed their commitment. Nothing to do with Pakistan.
ANSWER (4): Michael Krepon has already answered this as well. India was getting tired of waiting for its proposal for global nuclear disarmament idea to gain acceptance. Even after the collapse of the USSR, when it looked like the existing nuclear powers had no intention of getting rid of their nuclear weapons, India decided to carry forward its program.
QUESTION (5): Even if we consider that Pakistan was ahead of India technologically that forced India to test, then why was Pakistan offering several proposals to keep the region free of NWs, and India always rejecting those proposals? Stimson Center has a complete list of the proposals that Pakistan offered. One needs to refresh the history and the timelines.
ANSWER (5): India has to deal with a nuclear-armed China to its north. So a nuclear-free South Asia is not enough for India. What India has been asking for is a nuclear-free world.
“Please recall PM Modi’s recent bluster that he actively supported terrorists in East Pakistan in 1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh” ……. Will the Government of Bangladesh standby this distorted viewpoint? The people of East Pakistan was subjected to systematic human rights violations and political discrimination by West Pakistan that posed a situation of mass exodus from East Bangladesh to India. The gross human rights violations, mass genocide and threat of a demographic imbalance in the region left India with no choice but to intervene. Lets not distort history and denigrate the freedom struggle of the Bangladeshis.
A well written article. Pakistan must realize that it cannot play the victim every time while extending support to so called “non-state actors” who perpetuate violence across the region. If it developed nuclear weapons to address its security needs then why does it need “non-state actors”? It only shows the continued insecurity of Pakistan as a nation, whose sole objective is to perpetually oppose and compete with India. For Pakistan to feel secure it must overcome this obsession about India. India will continue to rise, Pakistan’s obstructionist behavior can utmost only create hurdles, often detrimental to its own interests, but cannot stop India’s rise. It is in Pakistan’s interest to come to terms with India and carve out its own identity on the world stage.
Krepon-
Thank you for the objective reporting. Any avid reader of Pakistan’s nuclear history can figure out that even when the civilians were in power, they were the least powerful to influence the nuclear policy. Slowly and gradually, the world is beginning to understand the deep state called Pakistan.
The usage of expressions “Rawalpindi’s Nuclear programs” explains the compulsions Pakistan had to go through as a state for acquiring TNWs. It explains the situation very well devoid of any biases. Above all, the expression is an addition to the existing narrative on South Asian nuclear discourse. Thoroughly enjoyed reading your essay, Michael.