Putin’s Nuclear Threat

Aaron Stein 0:08

Hello and welcome to the Arms Control Wonk podcast. My name is Aaron Stein. I'm a contributor to the Arms Control Wonk blog. I'm also an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London and a PhD candidate at King's College.

Jeffrey Lewis 0:20

And I'm Jeffrey Lewis. I'm the founding publisher of Arms Control Walk. And I am the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Aaron 0:34

Actually, Aaron, we're changing the name. Did you know this? I didn't know this. What's the name?

Jeffrey 0:37

Yeah, it's going to be the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at...

Aaron 0:42

Oh, wow. Wow, that's quite a change. It should be foggy Monterey because it's foggy today. Well, it's very sunny here in Geneva. 86 degrees today. Oh, you're going down to the lake? I am going down to the lake, assuming it's still there, especially after Vladimir Putin threatened us with nuclear weapons. Yeah, that's right. Did we just get threatened with nuclear weapons?

I think we did.

Jeffrey 1:04

Yeah, for the listeners, what we're going to talk about today are a series of comments by the Russian president involving nuclear weapons that seem to have caused a lot of anxiety. And it foreshadows a column that I will write today. Between the podcast recording and teaching my class on whether or not we're looking at a nuclear use in Europe.

So let me read the comments to you. Here's what Mr. Putin said. He was at a youth conference and one of the young people asked him a question about historical memory. And I'm not sure what that has to do with anything. But Putin answers the question about the role of historical memory by saying, naturally, we need to be ready to respond to any aggression against Russia.

Our partners, no matter what the situation in their countries and their foreign policy ideas they follow, always need to be aware that it's better not to enter into any political or rather. Enter into any potential armed conflict against us. Fortunately, though, I don't think anyone has the intention today of trying to start a large-scale conflict against Russia.

Let me remind you that Russia is one of the world's biggest nuclear powers. These are not just words. This is the reality. What's more, we are strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability and developing our armed forces.

Aaron 2:24

I think that was taken right from 1968, right?

Jeffrey 2:26

Yeah, he's waving the stick around a little bit.

Aaron 2:31

He definitely is. He spoke earlier, too. He made a similar threat, I think, in Crimea as well.

Jeffrey 2:37

Yeah. So he went to this crazy conference. And I think Vladimir Zaranovsky was there. And he Started talking about military spending, and he said, some things have already been disclosed, say, in the area of strategic offensive arms, I mean nuclear deterrence forces. Some information remains secret, but we will disclose it when the time comes. We are working hard, and our engineers, researchers, and workers are putting a lot of effort into it.

So there have been this series of... Highlighting the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear forces. And it's causing a little bit of anxiety. And Anne Applebaum, who is, among other things, a columnist for the Washington Post, wrote something called, an op-ed called War in Europe is Not a Hysterical Idea. In which she talks a little bit about the possibility that the current crisis might really get quite hot and mentions the writings of a Russian dissident who thinks that there's a certain enthusiasm in the Kremlin, or at least in the Russian general staff, for limited nuclear options.

Aaron 3:52

So... Yeah, I know it... It's like 1968. It is like 1968. I mean, it's not every day that... The Russians overtly signal their willingness to use nuclear weapons, particularly now with the NATO summit going on and with all the things that are going on with eastern Ukraine. I mean, I think we can just call it what it is now.

It's an invasion. It's no longer little green men operating behind enemy lines. It's Russian tanks, Russian vehicles, and the like. And so I think it's worth asking whether or not the assertions made in the Annapelbaum piece should be battled around, whether we should talk about them a little bit more.

Jeffrey 4:31

Yeah, I guess it's worth talking a little bit about... Well, you know, one thing I would say, and I want to be careful about how I say this because, you know, she's a respected writer in her own right. But, you know, she is married to the Polish foreign minister. She does spend, I think, a fair amount of her time in Warsaw.

And so, you know, I think that... You know, that's, I think, both good and bad, right? I mean, I think it's good in the sense that she doesn't simply reflect views in D.C. She also, I think, is quite familiar with views in Eastern Europe. But that's probably also a difference. You know, I think when you're that close to both the ongoing aggression but also the historical occupation, you know, I guess the way I would say it is someone was pointing out that the polls are often quite unreasonable about the Russians.

And a colleague of mine said, so if you look at the last couple hundred years of Polish history, what would constitute a reasonable attitude toward the Russians?

Aaron 5:43

No, certainly. I mean certainly the anxieties are higher there. But I think that – Actually raises some interesting questions that we also needed to ask and discuss. Go ahead.

Jeffrey 5:57

I said, yeah, absolutely.

Aaron 5:59

Yeah. I mean, with the NATO alliance going on and with one of our previous podcasts about the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, I think it speaks to the differences that we're seeing about – The way in which nuclear weapons are perceived amongst the different allies. Whereas in Poland, they may be thought of as the Russians being more willing to use them than, say, in the United States and how this influences policy decisions.

Jeffrey 6:27

Right. So I think maybe the way to do this is to talk a little bit about the source material because Applebaum just sort of – her piece, which I think is quite good, is mostly about – I shouldn't say it's mostly about, but it makes this artful argument, which is if you look at photographs of Europe in the late 1930s, people seem so happy, right?

And their life seems so normal. And her point, which I think is a very good one, is that these people don't anticipate the misery that's coming, right? The coming misery. And I think her idea, which I think is a very good one is We are often slow to recognize these kinds of changes. But she's not primarily a nuclear analyst.

And so her observations about the prospect of a nuclear use come from an article written by a Russian dissident named Andrei Piontkovsky. In true Arms Control Wonk podcast fashion, I'm sure I've murdered his Russian name.

Aaron 7:40

Yeah, that's our specialty.

Jeffrey 7:41

Yeah, we're good at that. And he makes this argument, it's in Russian, so reading it in translation, it's a little difficult to follow. But he reflects that mutual assured destruction or notions of strategic stability exist at a very high level in terms of a complete nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia. But he's focused on the possibility of limited nuclear uses below that threshold.

And he has this idea that there is some enthusiasm within the Russian general staff for those concepts. So at one level, I think it's probably worth us discussing what the Russian – oh, go ahead.

Aaron 8:35

Well, it's not atypical of the debates that we're having here in the United States, particularly about the rungs of deterrence and escalation and where is that trip line and is there an ability to stay beneath the – Where you could use nuclear weapons but not trigger a massive exchange. And I think that's what he was hinting at in the argument as well, that there may be enthusiasm for that in the Russian side.

Right.

Jeffrey 8:58

So he makes this argument, which I think is correct, which is, you know, a nuclear strategy isn't, he says, it's not just a dry mathematical analysis of scenarios, but it's a psychological tool. And I think the point is a good one, which is we can try to reason out what various parties ought to think. But that's not the same thing as knowing what they do think.

And so people might get crazy ideas.

Aaron 9:24

Right. I mean – and I think this is where we have to link it back into the statements made by the Russian – by the Russian president, by Vladimir Putin. What was his – what do you think or what do we think were the reasons for him making that statement, particularly with all the tensions going on in Ukraine and again with all the meeting of the NATO summits going on as we record this podcast?

So I –

Jeffrey 9:48

I think those statements are intended to be threatening in a – I guess I will say in a defensive sense, although Moscow's notion of what's defensive probably feels pretty offensive if you're in Ukraine. But I think – what I think Putin wants is a free hand to operate militarily against Ukraine including invading but also using forces from Russian territory like rocket artillery and missiles.

And so I think his – His defensive idea, put defensive in scare quotes, is to create a kind of sanctuary from which Russia can act with impunity. Because if we were to try to respond, right, if we were to try to, say, interdict the forces that we're invading, then you'd have to strike Russian territory. And I think he's trying to raise the prospect of a nuclear war, right?

To inhibit the Western allies from coming to the aid of Ukraine.

Aaron 11:09

Right. In a way, President Obama did that himself yesterday. He went to Estonia yesterday and gave this big talk where he reaffirmed the commitment to Article 5. So what I'm curious about is, have we given Ukraine away here? I mean, and by him making these threats, is he not extending, let's say, air quotes, Russian extended deterrence over now what He believes this eastern Ukraine is now part of Russia.

Russian extended deterrence is like Russian responsibility to protect, right? Right. Exactly. He R2P'd his way into eastern Ukraine on the ostensible notion he's protecting ethnic Russians. Would he not do the same with nuclear weapons? Is that what he's telling us? Yeah, I think his goal...

Jeffrey 11:54

So, well, okay, Piankovsky says this. And, you know, he says this in a kind of charged way. But I think it's basically fair, right? He says that Putin's agenda is not the destruction of the United States, which could be achieved only at the cost of mutual suicide. But he says the agenda is more modest. It's the maximum expansion of the Russian world.

The collapse of NATO discrediting and humiliating the United States as a guarantor of security. And he argues that in general, that's a revenge for the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War. I think he is right that Putin's goal is the maximum expansion of the Russian world. And I think he sees NATO as a barrier to that.

And I think his goal is to break NATO. And undermine the credibility of the United States. And my guess is, and I've written this in other columns, I think the Germans are the key player in this. Because I think what Putin wants is a neutral Germany that mediates the relationship between Russia, which can then push around its neighbors, and the more traditional West.

I'm not sure that that's a feasible outcome for him, but I think that's why he goes to Gerhard Schroeder's birthday parties.

Aaron 13:19

Or it's like a return to West German Ostpolitik with the East Germans, sort of this weird detente that they had going on.

Jeffrey 13:25

Well, you know, but that's why – I think that's why – or first of all, that is what the Soviets sought when they negotiated the unification of Germany, right? They wanted a neutral Germany that was outside of NATO. And they didn't get that. And so I think – I mean, one of the reasons I'm not terribly sympathetic to the argument that NATO expansion freaked out the Russians is I think from the Russian perspective, the NATO – the expansion of NATO to East Germany set in motion this chain of events, right?

That the Russians wouldn't have been happy – the Russians wanted NATO to shrink, right? So unless we were prepared to shrink it, we were probably – We were starting down this path. But the good news is, right, I think this is why he's actually unlikely to use nuclear weapons. Go on. Right. Well, okay, so if Putin uses nuclear weapons, you know, the Germans, who are the most anti-nuclear of all the NATO powers, right, I think, Are very likely to be horrified and shocked by this.

So if his goal is to break NATO by pulling the Germans into a kind of neutralist position with regard to the West and Russia, thus giving them a free hand to push around the Ukrainians and the Poles and the Baltics, I think using a nuclear weapon is contrary to that goal.

Aaron 15:09

I think it goes back to – well, A, I agree with all of that. I don't actually think he's going to use nuclear weapons. But I think in order to start the argument, we have to understand what exactly his motives are in Ukraine. I mean where does he want to stop this conflict? Is he happy with where it's going?

Does he want to keep pushing towards Kiev in two days as he says he could? Which he probably could to be fair. And if so, was he making the threat?

Jeffrey 15:36

Don't forget we got into Baghdad not too much later than that.

Aaron 15:40

Yeah, I know.

Jeffrey 15:41

I mean I don't think he was – I don't think it was hubris on his part, but I don't think his assessment is incorrect. Well, that's – getting in is usually the easy part. It's getting out that's hard.

Aaron 15:51

Well, I mean I just think A, with the threat, I mean I think we've covered that. But B, it's where is he going to stop the expansion of – Of Russian territory, let's call it, and when will he be satisfied that he's responsibly protected all ethnic Russians who are quote-unquote under threat?

Jeffrey 16:11

Well, what do you think? Because I've got a – I have a disturbing answer to that question.

Aaron 16:19

My answer to this is from the very outset of this conflict, everybody sort of expected that he'll stop. And he hasn't stopped. I mean his forces shot down a civilian aircraft and that didn't even shame them. History suggests that we shouldn't mirror, that we shouldn't say, oh, well, we would stop if this – if these set of events happened in our country.

I think we should say this is what he's done up to this point and he showed no – No signs of stopping. So I take his two-day threat very seriously. I do too.

Jeffrey 16:58

So I think, I wrote a column in Foreign Policy on this broader point about the sources, we called it the sources of Putin's conduct, which is a deliberate reference to George Kennan's The Sources of Soviet Conduct.

Aaron 17:14

And I suspect that

Jeffrey 17:20

The desire to unite the Russian world and to subjugate the non-Russian neighbors. And by the way, right, uniting the Russian speaking world, it's a hop, skip and a jump to uniting the Slavic world. I suspect that kind of impulse is driven by a fundamental sense of insecurity that, you know, that like the Soviet leadership, Putin feels like He has to try very hard to stay in power.

And so there's a tendency as his legitimacy declines to try to blame outside forces, right? So there's this desire to see these plots and conspiracies. And the problem with when you start to look at the world in that kind of conspiratorial way, I think there's always a justification for subjugating the next set of neighbors, right? So let's say he goes into Kiev and Kazakhstan and Belarus are completely controlled.

I think he feels the need to start pushing around the Baltics and Finland and Poland. He's already doing it in Finland. Right. So I think it doesn't stop because it's not about an objective requirement for security. Right. It's about an insecurity that comes from that government essentially not having an inherent legitimacy, right? Because it's an authoritarian regime that a significant portion of the population realizes is corrupt and violent.

Aaron 19:04

Well, what does that say about the use of nuclear weapons, particularly with what we know about Russian nuclear doctrine? I mean their nuclear doctrine is different than ours to an extent. I mean their use of – Let's just say their doctrine is slightly different than ours in that the way they envisioned certain scenarios in which they would use nuclear weapons.

Jeffrey 19:24

Well, and I think this is a good spot to be an empiricist about it because, you know, it's very easy to try to reason through. I mean, again, I don't think the use of nuclear weapons matches the strategy that they've had, right? And the strategy they've had is, hey, the great thing about nuclear deterrence is it opens up the world for all kinds of Russian conventional aggression, right?

So... They think, Oh, we can run in the motorcycle gangs and follow us up with the tanks. And because we have nuclear weapons, the West can't do anything to us directly, which is then why I think he then starts, you know, puffing his chest out and, you know, talking about how great their nuclear weapons are. It enables his conventional aggression.

If you actually got to a point where there was a huge conventional conflict in Europe You know, the Russians do seem to like to end their exercises with a nuclear use. And it's not clear to me at what point the general staff thinks they should resort to a battlefield use of nuclear weapons to stave off a defeat, thinking that if they refrain from using strategic weapons that, you know, that they will be able to deter attacks on Moscow and Petersburg and so on.

Aaron 20:44

Yeah, what you're saying is that if they are faced with a scenario where NATO conventional forces are threatening and that their, let's say, their most westward positions are in danger of falling, their statements or their history suggests that that was one such scenario where they could consider using, let's call them theater nuclear weapons rather than strategic nuclear weapons.

Jeffrey 21:11

Right. So they used to have a no first use pledge, right? They wouldn't be the first to use nuclear weapons. And most people thought that they would probably violate that on the first day of the war. And there's some evidence, being careful here, some evidence that they would have. They've dropped the pledge and there are military exercises and there are presumably plans to use nuclear Nuclear weapons.

But what we don't know is whether leaders would act on those plans. If that, if that makes any sense at all. Right. I mean, it's one thing to say, ha, we will nuke the invaders. Right. But then when you actually have to nuke the invaders you know, well, it says we have to do it on the little piece of paper.

Like, well, There are some ways in which I think those organizational decisions can be very sticky because you commit to certain actions and there's a playbook and you follow them. But I think there also is an element of human agency, which makes it a kind of interesting question. So I don't know what they would –

Aaron 22:33

But I think now let's broaden it out a little bit. What exactly should we do about it? What are our policy options here after the quote-unquote threats, the defensive threats, let's call them, from Russia? Are the defensive threats all that different from maybe some of the stuff that we've seen during the Cold War? And exactly what should we do about it?

Right.

Jeffrey 22:54

So I think there's kind of good news and bad news, I guess. It's mostly bad news. On the one hand, whenever the Russians talk about nuclear weapons, I think there's a natural tendency on our side to say, oh, well, we could talk about our nuclear weapons too. But there is always an ambulance driving by you. It's hilarious.

Are you by the hospital?

Aaron 23:20

I live right next door. I live close to the hospital on the main thoroughfare all day, every day. It's idyllic. I have a view of the lake, but you have to put up with that. Yeah, that's how you can afford the lake view. That is how you can afford the lake view. Exactly right. But anyways, as you were saying.

Jeffrey 23:37

I was saying, here's the problem. If Russia thinks that its nuclear weapons, its strategic nuclear weapons, exist to deter attacks on the Russian homeland, And therefore that enables Russian conventional aggression and may enable limited nuclear aggression. We don't really have a solution to that, right? I mean, we can build nuclear weapons so that we too can engage in limited conventional aggression.

And it's harder to imagine us doing it, well, whatever. You could imagine even engaging in limited nuclear aggression But you don't, you know, there's no, I think, realistic prospect of having the sort of nuclear or conventional forces that would deny the Russians the security of at least a theoretical deterrent, right? Any president would look at the Russian nuclear forces and if they were told, well, it's a 90% chance you'll get them all.

It's like, well, the other 10% is a pretty horrible day. And so I think both the United States and Russia, by virtue of their arsenals, have this kind of basic level deterrent. And so we can't solve this problem with nuclear weapons. And I sometimes hear people engage in this scenario building where they say, well, what if Putin used one against a Baltic state?

And we kind of go through this bizarre scenario theorizing. And by the way, the answer is if one party is risk-willing, They're always able to kind of do these things, right? I mean, you see, I think, over and over and over again in the history of U.S. nuclear policy, every president comes into office and they get briefed on the options for using nuclear weapons.

And they look at them and they're like, these are all suicidal and terrible and not credible. Come up with some more limited options. And Nixon had limited nuclear options. Carter had the countervailing strategy. Reagan had prevailing in a protracted nuclear war. Like everybody goes through this exercise. And at the end of the day, there's never a solution.

Because it's essentially a political problem, right? The problem is that we are always worried that the Russians are way more willing to take risks than we are. And we try to imagine that we can come up with some nuclear technical solution, like a more accurate bomb or a smaller bomb, but it never solves that problem. Or missile defense.

Right, right, right, right. Although here I think we should distinguish, you know, there's the missile defense that protects the United States, Which probably would never work well enough to enable us to start coercing the Russians. But then there are the sort of theater missile defenses, which actually might help deal with some of these Russian conventional artillery and long-range missiles.

So I think all we can do is spend a bunch of money on conventional defense, Put yourself in a position to deny the Russians a conventional victory and hope that your conventional capabilities are good enough in terms of theater missile defenses and interdicting supply lines that even a limited nuclear use wouldn't deliver a battlefield victory for the Russians.

I think that's all you can do.

Aaron 27:28

Yeah. Well, it goes back to the discussion of the podcast plug about feeder nuclear weapons in Europe, tactical nuclear weapons in Europe that we're having, and saying, is NATO's deterrence actually its conventional forces? And can you, by virtue of ensuring conventional superiority, deter without having to use nuclear weapons, i.e. You cannot win a conventional victory? So you cannot – You know, your options for, say, sending little green men behind, let's say, Latvia or Estonia's line is not as, say, attractive as it is for Ukraine.

And so should we be spending our money on conventional forces to counter the nuclear threat rather than what would, you know, Just straight up deterrence theory, if they are going to threaten with nukes, then you have to come out and threaten yourself in order to maintain that concept of mutually assured destruction. You know what I'm saying there?

Jeffrey 28:29

Yeah. Well, I think that's, I mean, you know, it's one of these things where it's not very welcome news, right? Like, Putin runs around talking about, like, oh, I have these nuclear weapons, and you think, like, oh, well, if only we could build the magic nuclear weapon that would solve that problem, right? But You know, it's real life and there isn't that magic nuclear weapon.

And so it turns out, right, like the solution to it is hard and really expensive and it's, you know, probably conventional. And even if we do it, like all things in life, there's no guarantee that it's going to work, which stinks.

Aaron 29:05

But, you know, that's how life is. Yeah, I've seen some proposals floating around already that maybe we should Name a target for the missile defense architecture that's being constructed in Europe. So rather than go out of our way and bend over backwards to say that the missile defense system is not aimed at Russia, it's aimed at other threats, you know, coffee run, coffee run.

We're just going to come out and say, oh, it's aimed at you now because of your belligerence in Ukraine and some of the rhetoric that you've been using. Do you think that's a wise policy? I'm on the fence. Yeah, I don't.

Jeffrey 29:43

Not because I – we had a very similar conversation to this when I was at a meeting that FRS in Paris held. Yep. And I think what I said at the time was I don't mind the tone. I don't mind saying to the Russians in tough language that their behavior makes us less willing to give them the kind of assurances that they say they want.

So I don't mind at all saying, hey, you know what? We have previously said we won't station things in Poland that bother you. That deal is off. Yeah. Having said that, I think the problems with the missile defense, the specific missile defense program are a few. The first is that system is really not designed to defend against the Russians.

Aaron 30:39

One could argue it's not designed to defend against anybody.

Jeffrey 30:43

Well, I don't know. It has its limitations. But it really provides no capability as far as I could tell against the Russians. And I think it's probably a bad idea to say we were lying, especially when we were telling the truth. But I also generally don't like bluffing. I think rather than trying to signal – In that way, I think it makes more sense to ask directly, what are the conventional forces we need to mount a credible defense of the Baltics?

And if we can arrange it, whatever remains of Ukraine that we can get into NATO and Poland. And then... Ask, are there things that we need to put in those countries? And then if some of the things that we need to put in those countries, whether they are theater missile defenses or whether they are conventional strike capabilities or simply combat aircraft, whatever we need to put in.

You know, then there's a question of like, well, how much does that irritate the Russians? And I'm okay with saying to the Russians, Hey, all these things that we're doing, that we're doing to defend against you, that irritate you, we wouldn't have to do them if you didn't behave like this. So I, again, I don't mind the tone.

I just think as a technical matter, the system really isn't intended to defend against the Russians. Doesn't really provide a lot of capability. And so I don't see the benefit in saying that. Yeah.

Aaron 32:23

No, I actually completely agree with you. I don't think it's a smart idea because A, it also could split the alliance, exactly what you're saying in the beginning. There are some states who hold – who really like the idea that NATO was never actually named a specific threat. And they don't want to break with that precedent. Turkey is one of those states.

There are others as well. I'm not exactly sure about the German position. But that just – it plays into the idea that you're naming a specific threat to the alliance, and I don't think we should actually do that. Maybe we'll wrap up here, but could the conventional – by the way, I agree, but is the – Is one of the things that we would have to consider with increased, let's say, precision strike on Russia's doorstep, and that doorstep is getting larger and larger, is will they be worried about decapitation from conventional arms?

And will that make them rely even more on nuclear weapons?

Jeffrey 33:22

Right. So I think that's absolutely a problem. I mean, I think that that's the fundamental strategic challenge that we have with the Russians, which is so much of their belligerence and hostility is motivated by this level of insecurity. And the insecurity that Makes them think that Pussy Riot is a secret CIA plot to topple Putin.

Aaron 33:43

I thought it was.

Jeffrey 33:44

Yeah, right. It's the same paranoia that causes him to... Did you read this article about how terrified he is of being poisoned when he travels abroad?

Aaron 33:51

Yeah, I saw that. Right?

Jeffrey 33:53

That's the same paranoia, and I think that paranoia then bleeds over into this terror that they're going to be decapitated. And so I do think... That as we focus on providing conventional defense to our allies, you know, at the end of the day, there has to be arms control. And there's got to be this other track where we talk to the Russians about stability.

And, you know, like some level, it seems weird, right? But to me, that's what like the defining aspect of the Cold War was, that we had this Deep, unbridgeable hostility. And yet, because both sides have nuclear weapons, we are stuck with each other. So you still got to talk about stability, even though you think you might very well fight a war over the Baltics.

Aaron 34:49

So you have to hit the reset button. But that reset button is different than what was intended at the beginning of the Obama administration.

Jeffrey 34:57

Right. Well, like this time, let's not set it to 1968.

Aaron 35:00

Right. That's trying – exactly right. But I want to say I think that joke is a good place to end it because it's a slightly positive note. We gave a way forward. At least something that didn't involve nuclear war.

Jeffrey 35:15

Right. Well, and I got to write this column now.

Aaron 35:17

Right. So thanks, everybody, for listening. I hope you enjoyed it. Thanks, Jeffrey, for joining me today. OK. Take care, Aaron. All right.