The Little Green Men and a New Cruise Missile

Aaron Stein 0:00

You are doing following six things that violate treaty. Hello and welcome to the Arms Control Wonk podcast, the only and therefore leading podcast on arms control non-proliferation and disarmament. My name is Aaron Stein. I'm a co-host of the show. I'm also a contributor to the Arms Control Wonk blog and an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Jeffrey Lewis 0:25

And I'm Jeffrey Lewis. In addition to being the co-host of the blog with Aaron, I am a scholar at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the founding publisher of the Arms Control Wonk blog. So, Aaron, it's stormy here in California. What's it like in Geneva?

Aaron 0:41

Gray. Gray. I haven't seen the sun in four days.

Jeffrey 0:45

Well, we're going to miss it, too. We have Pineapple Express coming. Do you know this term? I don't know this term. Pineapple Express. It's like the worst storm in a decade, and it's hammering San Francisco, and we're getting the edge of that. Oh, excellent. Maybe we'll lose the internet connection. We'll have to see. We'll see. We're going to talk about the INF Treaty today.

That's right. So for listeners who are interested, a few months ago we did a podcast on the allegations that the United States has made that Russia is in violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Yesterday, the House Armed Services Committee had a hearing at which Rose Gottmuller and Brian McKeon testified. And while the transcript's not out yet, there are copies of their testimony that are available.

There are news reports coming out. And it seemed like it was an interesting discussion. And maybe it was time for us to revisit the topic.

Aaron 1:51

Yeah, I think it's time to go back to one of our early babies, the INF. And Russia's no longer a legend, now sort of out there in the open violation of the treaty.

Jeffrey 1:59

Well, I guess we're alleging, right? So the first thing to say is that the Russians continue to, at least according to Rose, refuse to acknowledge the existence of the non-compliant cruise missiles. So, Aaron, I suppose we should say there are two issues that have bothered the Obama administration. The 1987 INF Treaty bans ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 5,000 and 5,500 – I mean 500 and 5,500 kilometers.

So there are these two systems, and if you look at the language in the letters that the – That various members of Congress have written to the president, they refer to a circumvention and a violation. And the circumvention refers to a Russian ICBM that many people think when it's fully loaded with all of its warheads is actually an IRBM and therefore prohibited by the treaty.

But that's a very questionable legal case, right? It may not be a very nice thing for the Russians to do. But at worst, it's a circumvention.

Aaron 3:12

Right. They took advantage of loose Loose treaty language in that one, it looks like.

Jeffrey 3:16

Yes, yes. So it arguably violates the spirit of the treaty, but perhaps not the letter. Right. But there is this other case which the State Department singled out in the most recent compliance report. Of a Russian cruise missile that allegedly has a range of more than 500 kilometers. And so the compliance report, although it gave essentially no details, said this cruise missile is a violation and repeated efforts to raise the issue with the Russians have not worked.

And so we're, I mean, I'm reading between the lines, but we've moved into the public shaming phase.

Aaron 4:01

Right. I mean, it also comes against sort of a much broader breakdown of diplomatic relations between our two countries with the Russian circumvention of state sovereignty, let's call it in Ukraine, of little green men. They're, they're not adhering to the letter of law of responsibility for responsibility to protect and their own interpretation of that. And just more generally, like sort of a return to – I almost feel like Cold War-type provocations coming from the Russians in terms of the way they're flying their aircraft over the Baltics.

We have the mystery sub in Sweden. I think I've seen more reports of a submarine outside of the UK this week. So it's been a pretty frosty relationship these past couple of months.

Jeffrey 4:51

And I should say we – While I am certain that the collapse in relations with Russia that have followed the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine While I'm certain that has shaped how the administration has pursued this issue, it's worth noting that concerns that the Russians were violating the treaty predate this. But it's just, I think in the past, people tried to play nice, and that didn't get them anywhere.

I mean, did you see one of the things I really liked about Brian McKeon's testimony was the way in which he Handled russian allegations that the u.s is in fact cheating on on the agreement and so basically it's the russians have no complaints no complaints no complaints then we're like hey that's a prohibited missile and they're like you are doing following six things that's violates treaty you know it's like deny everything make counter accusations

Aaron 5:52

Right. It's create the straw man and then argue at the straw man rather than get to the issue. I think the issue really isn't the circumvention for us per se. It's more this glickum, this ground launch cruise missile and perhaps the implications for the threat to the security of Europe, what it means for NATO and what we're going to have to do about it, if anything.

Well, and I think we have a –

Jeffrey 6:15

Bigger glickham problem than people have wanted to talk about because there's the there's the ground launch cruise missile i.e glickham that violates the inf treaty but something that people don't really talk about but i am pretty sure is happening is i think the russians are deploying nuclear armed cruise missiles on their attack submarines And they're sending those out.

And so the Russians, I think, have a series of new cruise missiles under development. They're sort of enthusiastic about them. In some cases, they're not well covered by treaties. In other cases, like the INF Treaty, the Russians are apparently violating them. And so there is this newfound Russian enthusiasm for a class of strategic forces. And I'm not sure that we have yet...

And this is not really intended as an indictment of anyone. It's just sort of this is a developing issue, and I'm not sure we've really yet come to grips with how we want to respond to this.

Aaron 7:16

Well, I mean, that is fascinating. What makes you think that they're sending new cruise missiles out to sea armed with warheads?

Jeffrey 7:24

So it's really kind of sketchy, but there have long been – Comments by Russian officials that suggest that this is something they could do, that they would do, and that they perhaps did do. And those comments are often a little bit ambiguous, but I think a lot of Americans assume that putting nuclear-armed cruise missiles on an attack sub would somehow be prohibited by the presidential nuclear initiatives, the informal undertakings that Bush and the George HW Bush and then Soviet leader Gorbachev and then followed by a Russian president Yeltsin that they undertook.

But in fact, it's not there's nothing that would prohibit that. And we talk about that, but I think it's a, it's a, it's a, we've, we've misread the Russian statements in a way that, that comforted us, but perhaps isn't accurate. And After that, the Russians started talking about... The head of the Navy said they were going to resume global deterrent patrols.

And I thought they would send out boomers, but they didn't. Instead, they started sending attack submarines. And, you know, you start putting two and two together, and you scratch your head, and you're like, I think I know what they're saying, right? And... What really cinched it for me is when the Russians started sending attack submarines out and on longer missions.

I think some of them were reported. Some of those were reported in the conservative press. The U.S. deployed the JLENS system, the warning system around Washington, D.C.

Aaron 9:14

Right. It's the – It's a blimp essentially with the improved radar to try and give some defense against cruise missiles.

Jeffrey 9:21

Yeah, I think that was very telling. I think that I'm almost certain that what happened was the U.S. intelligence community concluded that there were nuclear-armed cruise missiles prowling up and down the coast and that they didn't have adequate warning. And so that's why they started flying the J-Lines missions.

Aaron 9:38

I actually didn't put two and two together. I just thought that they were finally trying to get serious about cruise missile defense. But maybe they are finally trying to get serious about cruise missile defense because of a new threat posed by cruise missiles.

Jeffrey 9:49

Hey, it could happen. That's the subject of another podcast we did in the past when we had poor sound quality.

Aaron 9:54

That's right. That was back when we were in a tank and somewhat underwater. People may not have understood us.

Jeffrey 10:00

Well, that's why they didn't listen to us, Aaron.

Aaron 10:01

The sound quality was poor.

Jeffrey 10:02

Now that we've fixed the sound quality, they're totally going to listen to us.

Aaron 10:07

Right. Well, this transitions us into what some of the options are that were laid forward that Brian McKeon put out in terms of how we're going to respond to this, or at least how we're thinking about responding to this apparent violation of the treaty. And perhaps what are the threats more generally of a new ground-launch cruise missile in Europe?

I mean, does it fundamentally change the balance of power in the region? What should we make of all this?

Jeffrey 10:37

So I think it's worrisome. I think there's a military component and there's a political component. And let me start by saying the INF Treaty prohibits all... Ballistic and cruise missiles of intermediate range, regardless of whether they are armed with conventional warheads or whether they are armed with nuclear warheads. And so I actually don't know, and I'm not sure that we know if the Russians plan to arm a new INF violating cruise missile with a conventional or a nuclear warhead.

And so that does shape a little bit One's question of what the particular challenge is. But I would say the military challenge and the political challenge are as follows. I'd be interested to see if you agree. In terms of the military challenge, I think the Russians are eager to hold at risk NATO targets, particularly things like air bases, command and control assets, missile defense systems, They're eager to hold those things at risk and a cruise missile is, Is a pretty effective way of doing that because it's, it's reasonably good at evading theater missile defenses.

And so you know, I certainly worry that if NATO had to stage a defense of say Lithuania that the ability to surge forces in through ports and air bases and the ability to communicate to those forces and the ability to defend them from conventional and, and potentially nuclear ballistic missile attacks, all of those things I think would be threatened by A new generation of ground launch cruise missile.

And if they're of a sufficiently long range, then the Russians can sort of hold those back further, right? Where they're better protected by, by Russian air defenses. And it, it raises this kind of challenge of, you know, if they're, if they're firing Conventionally armed, or, or, or god forbid, nuclear armed missiles from the Russian homeland at our allies, that, that poses kind of a challenge in terms of like how, how aggressive we are in going to get those systems. But then I think, yeah, go ahead. No, I, I also think it's like, it's just the way warfare is changing. I mean, when we first conceived of the idea of a defense against missiles, it was primarily, again, I mean, it was completely against ballistic missiles and I think.

Aaron 13:16

One thing that's coming as a result of our increased emphasis on ballistic missile defense is a turn towards cruise missiles. Cruise missiles are thought of as a cheaper alternative with precision strike that can be armed with either nuclear or conventional. I would actually assume conventional. I was reading Dennis Gormley's latest with Andrew Erickson and Jingdong Yuan about China's cruise missile ambitions.

One thing that really caught my eye, he was talking about defending ships. From any ship cruise missiles, but the cost estimates are it costs nine times more to defend against a cruise missile than it does to – for the defense than it does for the offense. So the cost ratio is even higher too. So it just creates a whole new complication and for a country like Russia, which is – Admittedly increasing its military budget in recent years.

Nevertheless, these things could be thought of as a low-cost multiplier that holds at risk targets that weren't really being held at risk before in this type of manner.

Jeffrey 14:22

Well, in the Russians – I mean I don't know if you've seen, but they have these videos where they show containerized cruise missiles. So the theory that they have is that they're going to hide, and they market these things for export, but one can easily imagine the challenge that this poses for, say, treaty verification. One can easily imagine them deploying very similar systems, and so it becomes really hard to think about targeting these systems.

Aaron 14:57

So I think they're a threat. Another thing is I don't think we should think about them any longer in Cold War-style terms. I mean their circumvention of state sovereignty in Ukraine was very much asymmetric. This wasn't an army marching across a border. This was the use of special forces, little green men and local militias to stir up trouble in this area.

Jeffrey 15:23

Right, which is what I think they're going to do in the Baltics.

Aaron 15:26

Right, and then if – I think it's a different doctrine. And I think we need to think outside the box of how these cruise missiles could be used to enforce that doctrine and how even coercive behavior on their part, not the cruise missiles per se, but the threat the cruise missiles pose could be used to coerce.

Jeffrey 15:45

So that's what I think the political challenge posed by the missiles is. I am tremendously worried that Russia has short-range nuclear systems and they have short-range cruise missiles. And so there are NATO allies that are very close to Russia that will always be within range and threatened by Russian strategic capabilities. Well, in their case, they're not technically strategic, but I'm sure if...

A short-range nuclear-armed missile goes off in Lithuania, that's going to feel terribly strategic to the Lithuanians. Right. Strategic has different meanings depending on your geography. Right. Right now, though, there are a whole bunch of countries in Europe that, because of the INF Treaty, they're reasonably safe. But not perfectly safe because there are things the Russians could do, firing things on depressed trajectories and so forth.

But generally speaking, there are a whole bunch of countries in Europe that... Part of the ability that they have to stand up to the Russians when they're mucking about in Ukraine or if they were to start mucking about in the Baltics is that they're not under immediate threat. And I think the idea of the Russians having nuclear weapons that can get to Berlin from Russia itself – In a relatively effective way, I think that's targeted at the cohesion of the NATO alliance.

And that's designed to make the Germans less willing to come to the defense of their neighbors if they're getting pushed around with the Russians. And I think that's a very serious challenge.

Aaron 17:21

No, it is a serious challenge. Depending on As Brian McKeon put forward, it says that it's exploring at least sort of in bullet points the New York Times. I think three options now about how we're supposed to respond to this.

Jeffrey 17:34

I should say though, but before you do that, I mean – and I haven't seen the back and forth in the question. In the testimony, he says, I'm happy to talk about it in closed session.

Aaron 17:45

Right. So I think this is – these are leaks, right? Yeah. It seems like they're leagues.

Jeffrey 17:51

Although, well, it does say Mr. McKeon said, so maybe he did say it in the, maybe he said it in the testimony, I mean in the conversation.

Aaron 17:58

Anyway, go ahead and read them. Yeah, so it says, depending on options, include deploying new defenses against cruise missiles, exploring whether to deploy American ground launch cruise missiles, whether to deploy American ground launch cruise missiles in Europe, which the New York Times points out would actually violate the INF, And building up other military capabilities without specifying what those are.

I don't find those terribly comforting, to be honest with you. What do you think about them?

Jeffrey 18:28

Well, I think – I have two sets of comments. I mean these are – First, the macro level comment is these are essentially symmetrical responses, right? We deploy defenses against the missiles, we deploy our own versions of the missiles, or we deploy alternative military systems that give us the equivalent capability in the missiles. And I don't have any objection to that, but I'm a little...

I'm interested, let's say, in the symmetry, because... I think the reason that the Russians want these capabilities is because they want to put Western Europe in peril so that the Germans and the French and the Dutch and the Belgians will be less willing to come to the aid of the Eastern European countries, including Eastern European NATO members who are going to be subject to Russian bullying.

You know, I'm just a little nervous in that deploying asymmetrical capability doesn't necessarily eliminate that problem, right? If in a world in which we both have intermediate range cruise missiles, the Russians still achieve their objective. So I'm fine with the options, but it seems to me that they're insufficient, that there's a whole political piece of this strategy which is not being talked about, not being discussed, and I suspect the political piece is more important.

Shoring up the Germans so that they're willing to come to the aid of the Lithuanians or the Estonians or the Latvians in the event that the Russian little green men show up there I think is going to take more than a cruise missile defense. So just that thought. And do we have a cruise missile defense? Right, yes.

So yeah, you know, yes, please, develop cruise missile defenses. I mean, Dennis has been begging that we do this for ages.

Aaron 20:37

Dennis Gormley, who comes up in every – almost every podcast we do. So he's like the silent arms control partner. We love Dennis. We do love Dennis.

Jeffrey 20:46

And every time we mention Dennis on the podcast, I have to restrain talking about the lovely train ride we took across northern Italy one time. But anyway, go ahead.

Aaron 20:54

No, I mean – Yeah, but you know where I fear it's going to go? Maybe I'm jumping the gun here, but I fear that this treaty violation will be politicized and that the answer will be we need more missile defense, i.e. More of the type of systems that we're deploying now, the SM-3, which I don't think will – which I think – Actually puts us in the catch-22.

If we put in more ballistic missile defenses into Europe to reassure Europeans and to defend against ballistic missiles with a nominal capability to attack cruise missiles as well, do we not incentivize the Russians to rely more on this cruise missile to defeat them? In other words, by putting static targets in this region, are we not – Encouraging the Russians to target them with something.

So I'm not even sure the SM three would have any capability against a cruise missile system. I mean, I was being kind because I know some people listen to this will disagree.

Jeffrey 21:54

Well, I mean, I just, I, I'm not sure kinematically that it would work at all. I mean, that's not even a criticism of the SM three of, of, of Aegis ashore. It's just, it's a, I think kinematically I'd be shocked if it worked. But I will say this. I do worry... I worry... I have long worried about our lack of interest in cruise missile defense.

You know, the Missile Defense Agency, despite the name, still is the ballistic missile defense organization at heart. You know, they don't do cruise missile defense. That's left largely to the services. And so... I would hate... I would hate for a new Russian cruise missile to reinforce our continuing tendency to ignore cruise missile defense, right? It should do the opposite.

And it's absolutely true that putting... We don't want to do anything that is an arms race that puts us further behind. If we're going to run an arms race with systems, we shouldn't run a dumb one. So that's the first thing. But I think we could develop and talk to allies about cruise missile defenses. And I would be fine with that.

Aaron 23:19

I would be more than fine with that. I think that's a good idea. We need it, especially for naval ships. So it's something that's a long time coming. I know that the Navy has tested systems or is testing systems designed for the anti-ship cruise missile. I don't think they're very successful, but at least there's something on the agenda in that regard.

I think it could be scaled up. I have problems with the second one they put out too, which is to deploy American ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. We say this on the podcast all the time. Don't make policy recommendations that have no chance of coming true. I mean when we tried to insert – when we did this before the 1980s, it nearly broke the alliance.

What's changed? So here's the thing.

Jeffrey 24:04

I think if this means deploy American nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, I think it's crazy talk. I think it will absolutely break the alliance. It's something that would delight the Russians. The Russians would be beyond happy if we tried to put new nuclear weapons into, say, Germany, and it triggered an enormous political crisis in Germany. The Russians would be delighted if we put them into Poland, and the Poles were beyond happy, but now suddenly the Germans were furious.

Right. You know, I think our political imperative in this conflict is to demonstrate that it's the Russians who are driving the conflict and it's the Russians who are seeking a free hand to bully their neighbors. And so any steps we take where it looks like we're the bad guys who are the problem, I think just makes it actually harder for us to credibly extend our security commitments to the countries that are about to be bullied by the Russians.

Aaron 25:07

I agree. It's almost like the name and shame policy, although the Russians seem below shame these days. But we have to stay on the right side of history in this debate, and we cannot stoop down to that level, if you want to say.

Jeffrey 25:20

Well, because we have to persuade people in France and Germany and the Netherlands and Belgium – That we're not the ones who are going to get us all killed. That we're defending and we're deterring, but we're not driving the conflict. This is actually what Michael Howard meant when he wrote his article about deterrence and assurance. In the United States, this wonderful early 1980s article by Michael Howard has gotten twisted.

And so people talk about assurance and reassurance as something we do to convince our allies that we'll be there for them, as though the big problem is that they're worried that we won't follow through on our commitments. But what Howard pointed out in the European context in the 1980s, and I think is absolutely true and is Likely to be a major issue going forward, I guess we're always going forward, I don't know why I said that, is that assurance is actually about persuading your allies that you're not driving the conflict, right?

That they should come along with you, that they should support you, and that we should all work together to meet our obligations. Because that's the big problem, right? The big problem is that, or the big worry is Germans say, ah, you know, Moscow and Washington, they're all the same. We should just be neutral and throw the poles to the wolves.

Aaron 26:52

Right. Exactly. And this is actually where our own alliance with our allies matters. And actually how some of the stuff that's come out recently about the NSA and stuff like that, how that was handled about the person we were talking about in last week's podcast who the auto pen just signs yes ma'am to. Yeah. Need to do a better job, particularly in this context.

Yeah. Yeah, but let's move on from that.

Jeffrey 27:14

No, but wait, but let me say this. No, say it. I do think my colleague, Bridge Colby, and my colleague, Steve Pfeiffer, and I have all, I think, independently come to the same conclusion, which is it does make sense, I think, to look at putting conventionally armed intermediate range missiles in Europe if... The treaty goes kaput. I don't think it makes sense to withdraw from the treaty.

I don't think it makes sense to take any steps that violate the treaty. But I don't think it would hurt to do a study and maybe start doing some R&D on what a conventionally armed IRBM for Europe would look like if the Russians continue down this path.

Aaron 28:09

So you conventionally arm cruise missile or ballistic missile? Yeah. I mean we could do that study. It wouldn't violate the treaty to do the study. Yeah.

Jeffrey 28:17

And I think that might help put into focus for more reasonable Russian leaders the reason they signed the treaty in the first place.

Aaron 28:28

Right. Certainly. Maybe a combination of ground launch and air launch. You could introduce a method of coercion because you could hold at risk more – Quickly, let's put, say, vital areas, command and control, military bases, et cetera, et cetera, in Russia itself.

Jeffrey 28:49

Yeah. I mean, not that I'm enthusiastic for getting back to massive conventional war planning with the Russians, but they did just invade the second of their neighbors in the last 10 years, so.

Aaron 29:03

I think they've changed the game, to be honest with you. I mean, I was thinking about this this morning, actually, before we started this, after I read the New York Times article. They've adopted tactics of asymmetry that you've seen in the Middle East to combat our conventional superiority, but they're far more powerful than the people that we've been fighting.

I think the game has changed a little bit. And that's a discussion for another podcast.

Jeffrey 29:24

No, but you're right in it. I think it's very important that keeping in mind that The strategy that the Russians have picked up in Ukraine, which I think is the strategy that they will probably try to put into place in one or more Baltic states, is it's a response to our conventional superiority. And so – and that's what I was trying to get at earlier when I said when they're adding these new capabilities and trying to chip away at our conventional superiority – Responding and rebuilding that superiority doesn't solve our little green men problem.

Aaron 30:01

No, they've studied our weaknesses these past 10 years, and they replicated some of those tactics, at least in Ukraine. And it actually puts us in a serious, serious problem because it puts us in a level of escalation Not to trip the nuclear line, but do we trip the collective defense line in NATO? And so they do muck around in a Baltic state that is covered by collective defense.

That line where you invoke Article 5 and then you have to move in. It's gotten way murkier, way fuzzier than it was in 1989.

Jeffrey 30:36

Yes. So we – yes. So I don't – as much as I want to respond very forcefully to this Russian violation, I don't want to do anything that actually increases the space for little green men to get away with this stuff.

Aaron 30:52

All right. Well, so we'll wrap up here with the third option. He said in building up other military capabilities. I took that sort of in – In connection with this announcement that NATO is going to create or move in a 4,000-strong rapid reaction force. Do you think they're linked, or are they separate, or they could be merged at a later date?

Jeffrey 31:16

I think they're separate, but they're being linked now. I mean, I, I had the same reaction, which is I interpreted that statement. And maybe I interpreted it a little more broadly. There's also been a whole bunch of effort by the U S to get NATO to do common airspace stuff. And so I, I look at the range of things that NATO needs to do collectively as an Alliance to deal with Russian I guess we'll call it aggression, bullying, general bad behavior, invading of neighbors, whatever pejorative term you want to hang on.

General nonsense. Yeah, right. Tomfoolery, whatever you want to hang on them. I'm fine with it. But there's this whole range of stuff NATO needs to be doing. So NATO needs to have a much better capability to respond to airspace and maritime violations. And that's a capability that I suspect the Swedes and the Finns will be now much more interested in participating in.

Same with the Brits? Yep. Yep. So there's all that stuff we need to do, plus there is the rapid reaction force. So there's... A range of things I think that NATO, that certain NATO member states have wanted to do for a long time. And I think others have thought are unnecessary or expensive or potentially provocative. And I take that last sentence to be a reference to those things.

And, and I would say it's actually, that's probably the best thing to do, right? Because the, what the Russians are trying to do is give themselves a capability to, That's a little bit threatening and a little bit coercive. And I think they plan to then use that to enable these kinds of other forms of bullying. And so being able to respond to that bullying directly, I think it's helpful.

You were going to say something.

Aaron 33:13

Yeah, but is that capability that allows them to bully, to coerce, going to be conventional on nuclear? Well, I think they're going to hold the nuclear back.

Jeffrey 33:24

And then they're going to use that threat of, oh, Germany, you want to participate in the rapid reaction force? You want to come to the aid of Lithuania? Well, keep in mind that there's a nuclear weapon sitting here in the heart of Mother Russia that can hit Berlin. And the Americans can talk tough all they want, but they know that if they come to your defense, that there's another nuclear weapon sitting here that can hit Washington.

So... I think that once they feel secure in that way, then – and this was the point of the podcast we did about Putin's crazy speeches, right, where he talks about how great Russia's nuclear weapons are. The reason I think he talks about how great they are is he's really saying, so I can go ahead and invade Ukraine and you're going to look the other way.

As long as I don't call it an invasion, as long as I pretend those kids all died in training accidents – You're going to look at my nuclear weapons and say, I don't want to push this. And so I think part of the problem is trying to address the nuclear weapons symmetrically, but I think it's way more important to be able to defeat the little green men.

Aaron 34:28

Yes, exactly. And so the recent stories about how the US was befuddled by this strategy were disconcerting. And they shouldn't be – frankly, nobody should be disconcerted or befuddled – disconcerted is not a word. Nobody should be befuddled by these tactics because they are the weaknesses that have been exploited by far, far, far weaker adversaries. In the conflicts we have been fighting since 2002 continuously.

And we can't beat it. It's bizarre to me that people are acting totally dumbfounded that the Russians are doing this. It's like, really? Yeah. Anyways.

Jeffrey 35:07

That's not a happy note, Aaron.

Aaron 35:09

No. To be honest, I'm frightened because I don't think we would leave Lithuania hanging out there in the cold. No, no. I don't think the Russian calculation, if you're correct, is correct. I think he's overstepping and I really hope I'm wrong. So I'm being doom and gloom. I'm actually going to have – I'm going to be European.

I've been in Europe long enough. If you ever watch foreign movies, which my wife makes me watch all the time, they never end on a happy note. Somebody always dies.

Jeffrey 35:36

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Aaron 35:38

Yeah, I'm doom and gloom because I don't think we let our NATO allies hang out in the wilderness. I think we would come.

Jeffrey 35:46

Yeah. I mean, this is my frustration with the way that we have tended to handle things, which is I feel like we try very hard to be reasonable and very hard to be flexible and very hard to see the other side of things. And there are places on which we're not flexible and we're not willing to move.

But we're almost afraid to be clear that those things exist, and so I do think the Russians may underestimate this president's resolve, although that's his fault.

Aaron 36:22

It's not just this president. When he goes – again, I just – I don't think we leave our allies hanging out there in the wilderness, and I really hope that they don't think that. Yeah, me too. This is the foreign movie.

Jeffrey 36:37

I wish you could see the torrential rainfall and storm here as you're being so, so dark and so gloomy because the outside, you know, Pineapple Express sounds so happy and cheery.

Aaron 36:51

I'm in Central Europe. I haven't seen the sun in days. It is dark. It is winter.

Jeffrey 36:58

You have a black turtleneck on.

Aaron 37:01

No, I don't. But it's reflective of our mood. So this was good. Thanks, everybody, for listening. And thanks, Jeffrey, for joining. I enjoyed this conversation. I guess it was fun. It was fun. All right. Take care, everybody.